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ABSTRACT
EX POST VALUATION CORRECTION 
AND MOTIVES OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION DECISIONS
Hien T. Nguyen 
Old Dominion University 
Chair: Dr. Kenneth Yung
This study seeks to decipher the motives of mergers and acquisitions and identify the source of 
value creation or destruction. The existing literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions 
generally agrees on four primary motives of merger and acquisition decisions: (1) market timing,
(2) response to industry shocks, (3) agency cost and hubris, and (4) synergy. In studying the 
motives behind acquisition decisions, prior studies have used incomparable methodologies and 
measures, which often lead to inconclusive debates. In this study, we address the possibility that 
there could be multiple motives behind a merger. Instead of using a multitude of methodologies to 
look for the existence of different motives of acquisitions, we use a single methodology that allows 
us to identify the motives simultaneously. Specifically, we examine components of the market-to- 
book ratio and correlate them with the motives of merger activity. By observing the changes in the 
components of the market-to-book ratio over long-run event windows after the merger, we are able 
to verify ex post the motives behind a merger and identify the source of value creation or 
destruction. Using a sample of 3,520 domestic merger events over a twenty-year period from 1985 
to 2004, we find significant evidence supporting that market timing, response to industry-shocks, 
and synergy could be simultaneous motives for some mergers. Stock mergers appear to be more 
related to the market timing motive than cash mergers as the improvements in post-merger 
operating performance of stock mergers less consistent than those of cash mergers. A decline in 
sales growth also suggests that many mergers may be driven by agency problems or hubris. It is 
likely that managers use overvalued common stocks to satisfy their personal interests through 
corporate mergers. On average, we also find that large acquirers and large acquisitions are more 
associated with market timing and agency problems and hubris.
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"... We would like to believe that in an efficient economy, mergers would happen fo r  the 
right reasons, and that their effects would be, on average, as expected by the parties 
during negotiation. However, the fact that mergers do not seem to benefit acquirers 
provides reason to worry about [the evidence]. Part o f the issue here may be that an 
acquiring firm can seek a merger fo r  a mix o f  reasons. Many firms mention mergers as 
their main strategic tool for growth and success, and point to possible economies o f  
scale, synergies, and greater efficiency in managing assets. Alternatively, there is the 
somewhat contradictory evidence that mergers can be evidence o f  empire-building 
behavior by managers. I f  mergers could be sorted by true underlying motivations, it may 
be that those which are undertaken fo r  good reasons do benefit acquirers, but in the 
average statistics, these are cancelled out by mergers undertaken fo r  less benign 
reasons. ” By Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001, p. 118).
The existing literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions generally agrees on 
four primary motives of acquisition decisions, including (1) market timing, (2) response 
to industry-shock, (3) agency cost and hubris and (4) synergy. Some of these motives 
work for the benefits of shareholders, some against. With the market timing motive, it is 
argued that mergers occur because corporate managers take advantage of market 
misvaluation by issuing overvalued stocks to acquire more assets; share value will be 
destroyed after the event once the misvaluation is recognized. With the response to 
industry-shock motive, it is argued that mergers occur because firms are prompted to 
merge to reap the benefits of some common shocks in the industry. This hypothesis 
predicts that both shareholder value creation and destruction are plausible after the 
merger, depending on how the market thinks the firm should act on each shock. The 
agency cost motive suggests that mergers occur because they enhance the acquiring 
manager’s welfare, even if  shareholders of the acquirer may suffer. The hubris hypothesis
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suggests that acquirers make mistakes in evaluating target firms, and engage in mergers 
even though there is no synergy or other benefits. Both the agency cost and hubris 
motives predict firm value destruction after the merger. Finally, the synergy motive 
argues that mergers occur because there are economic gains from merging the resources 
of firms and firm value is created as a result.
Conflicting results of the effect of mergers and acquisitions on firm value, based 
on the post-merger share price performance, have been reported in the literature. Healy et 
al (1992), Jarrell et al (1988), Andrade et al (2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004) find 
the combined share value of the acquirer and target increases after the merger 
announcement. Mandelker (1974), Lengetieg (1978), Bradley and Jarrell (1988) study 
the stock returns of acquiring firms and do not find significant abnormal returns after 
controlling for risk and industry factors. On the other hand, Asquith (1983), Malatesta 
(1983), Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), and Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) find 
significant negative returns for acquiring firms after the merger.
It is not uncommon for corporate decisions to have multiple motivations given 
that firm ownership and control are separated. Since different motives could have 
conflicting impacts on firm value, it is inevitable to observe the inconsistent empirical 
findings of post-merger stock returns. The problem is made worse when researchers try to 
reach a conclusion despite non-comparable methodologies have been used to examine the 
motives of acquisitions. For example, in arguing for the market timing motive, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) examine the 
market-to-book ratio to see how overvaluation drives waves of mergers and decides
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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means of payment, mode of acquisitions, acquisition premium and post-merger returns. 
They find that acquirers are more overvalued than targets, and overvalued acquirers 
prefer to use stock to pay for their acquisitions. In addition, they also find overvalued 
acquirers are more willing to pay a higher premium for acquisitions and more often 
experience a negative post-merger return.
In arguing for the response to industry-shock motive, Mitchell and Muherin 
(1996), Harford (2005), Andrade and Stafford (2004) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
study aggregate merger and acquisition activity at the industry level and look for clusters 
of mergers and acquisitions through time and link these clusters with macro shocks of the 
industry or of the whole economy. They find strong evidence that merger activity clusters 
through time by industry and that merger activity is driven by macro industry and 
economic shocks. Finally, in advocating the synergy and agency cost and hubris motives, 
many studies (for example, see Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001), Malaesta (1983), and Berkovitch and Nayanan (1993)) examine the post-merger 
share values of the acquirer and target to see whether both parties gain (synergy motive); 
or the target gains and the acquirer loses (agency cost motive); or if there is ambiguity 
regarding who gains and who loses (hubris motive).
In view of the multitude of methodologies used in studies of corporate 
acquisitions, we can approach the conflicting findings of the motives of mergers and 
acquisitions in two ways. One is to isolate the motives of mergers and acquisitions and 
examine how investors react to each motive. This solution is however difficult to carry 
out because the acquirer sometimes does not announce its motive for the acquisition. In 
addition, even if  a motive is announced, there could have been other unannounced
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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motives hidden behind. This leads us to the second way of handling the problem. The 
second solution is to use a single methodology that can study the various motives of 
mergers and acquisitions simultaneously. In this manner, we could more unambiguously 
identify the motives of acquisitions because the same methodology is used in identifying 
each motive and conclusions are drawn based on observations of some common 
parameters. Specifically, in this study, we apply the method of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson 
and Viswanathan (2005) (RKRV, henceforth) to decompose the acquirer’s market-to- 
book ratio into three components. We argue that studying the components of the market- 
to-book ratio not only can verify the market timing motive (as in RKVR) but also can 
effectively identify other motives that are synergy or agency cost or hubris related. We 
decompose the M/B ratio into three components: firm-specific mispricing, industry- 
specific mispricing, and long-run-value-to-book-value. The level and change in each of 
these three components over long-run event windows after the merger can serve as the ex 
post evidence of the motivation of the merger. If the firm-specific mispricing reduces 
after the merger, we argue that market timing was the motive. If the industry-specific 
mispricing increases after the event, there was an industry shock triggering the decision 
to merge. If the long-run-value-to-book-value component increases, synergy was the 
motive for the merger. If long-run-value-to-book-value reduces after the merger, then 
either agency cost or hubris related motives are accountable for the merger.
We examine a sample of 3,520 domestic merger events in the twenty-year period 
between 1984 and 2004 obtained from Securities Data Corporation and find very 
significant evidence that market timing, industry-shock responding, and synergy motives 
exist simultaneously for some mergers and acquisitions. Among our other important
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findings, firstly, our results show that the market learns quickly its mistake of the pre­
merger overvaluation of the share value of the acquirer and corrects the mistake quickly 
after the acquisition announcement. Secondly, our results show that some mergers are 
related to industry and economy shocks. On average, the market reacts favorably to such 
mergers and that leads to an increase in the value of the acquirer after the merger. 
Thirdly, we find the long-run-value to book value decline after mergers. Lastly, post­
merger operating performance analysis shows that there are inconsistent improvements 
on average. A part of the improvement could be due to the relative decline in non-merger 
firms over the same period. In addition, cash mergers show significant improvements 
over the one-year window whereas stock mergers have conflicting changes. Finally, we 
also find evidence that large acquirers and large acquisitions are more associated with 
market timing and agency/hubris problems.
The contributions of this study to the literature on mergers and acquisitions are in 
methodology and findings. Regarding methodology, this is the first study that examines 
components of the market-to-book ratio and uses their changes over time to identify the 
motives of a merger decision. The long-run study of the M/B components takes into 
account the time period needed for restructuring and managing merger period turbulences 
and therefore gives a more precise observation of the motivations and effects of the 
merger. Regarding findings, this is the first study that considers the possibility that 
mergers and acquisitions could have different motives simultaneously. In this manner, we 
address the corporate decision making practice more realistically.
Chapter II o f the dissertation includes a review of the literature on motives of 
mergers and acquisitions and describes the methodology of M/B ratio decomposition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter III develops the hypotheses. Chapter IV describes the sample and methodology. 
Results are presented in chapter V and conclusions are in chapter VI.




I. Empirical evidence of post-merger performance of acquirer firms
Empirical studies on post-merger performance of acquirers have documented 
contradictory results of the effect of mergers and acquisitions on firm value.
The group of studies that finds ambiguous evidence of the effect of mergers on 
firm value starts with the work of Langetieg (1978). In his study, he documents that the 
post-merger abnormal return of the acquiring firm is not significantly different from that 
of a control firm in the same industry. Later, Malatesta (1983) studies a sample of 121 
mergers from 1969 to 1974 and finds a significant -2.9 percent abnormal return over the 
twelve month post-merger horizon. There are significant differences between the 
performance of mergers involving large and small acquiring firms. Acquiring firms with 
a market value in excess of $300 million twelve months prior to the merger approval 
display an insignificant 4.5 percent average abnormal return, while acquirers valued at 
less than $300 million display a significant -7.7 percent abnormal return. However, 
though he does not attribute his finding to market inefficiency, Malatesta does not rule 
out the possibility that any technique used to determine expected returns perhaps does not 
adequately capture all relevant risks or changes in risks. In addition, Bradley and Jarrell 
(1988) do not find significant underperformance in the three years following acquisitions. 
Using a longer sample period from 1975 to 1984, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 
examine post-merger returns of 399 acquiring firms. Depending on the benchmark used,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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they report a range of cumulative abnormal residuals between an insignificant -3.96 
percent to a significant +10.44 percent. The calendar-time abnormal return estimates also 
vary wildly from an insignificant -7.92 percent to a significant +13.22 percent. They also 
partition the sample based on different firm deal characteristics such as means of 
payment, relative sizes of the target and bidder, and level of opposition by target 
managers. Though smaller bidders outperform larger bidders only when inefficient 
portfolios are used as benchmarks, the difference in abnormal returns of the two groups 
disappears when efficient control portfolios are used. This finding holds when the sample 
is partitioned on the basis of relative size rather than raw size. Likewise, the superior 
performance of cash bidders relative to stock bidders and that of bids opposed by target 
managers also disappear when efficient benchmarks are used. Therefore, Franks et al fail 
to find convincing evidence of either negative post-merger returns or differences in post­
merger returns between sub-samples formed on the basis of firm or deal characteristics.
Another group of studies finds significant evidence that mergers are value 
destruction transactions. Asquith (1983) employs a control portfolio approach and finds 
that for a period of 240 days after the merger, the studied sample of 196 mergers between 
1962 and 1976 exhibits a significant -7.2 percent calendar-time abnormal return. Later, 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) study a nearly exhaustive sample of mergers 
between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets and find that stockholders of 
acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss of 10.26% over the five-year post­
merger period, a result robust to various specifications. Their findings suggest that neither 
firm size effect nor beta estimation problems is the cause of the negative post-merger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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returns. Their results also do not seem consistent with the hypothesis that negative post­
merger returns are caused by a slow adjustment of the market to the merger.
Evidence of value creation by mergers is also abundant. Extending the review 
studies of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Andrade 
and Stafford (2004) review empirical research on mergers in the three decades from 1973 
to 1998 and conclude that mergers create value to shareholders of both target and 
acquirer firms. However, while the target firm significantly gains in both short- and long- 
run event windows, the acquirer firm seems to be subsidizing the target’s gain and suffers 
a loss. However, the evidence for value destruction of acquirer firms is not very 
statistically sound. The average three-day abnormal return for acquirers is -0.7 percent, 
and over longer event windows, the average acquiring firm abnormal return is -3.8 
percent, neither of which is statistically significant at conventional levels. Andrade et al. 
admit that this insignificant evidence challenges the claim that the acquirer firm’s 
shareholders are losers in mergers. The review work of Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2001) is consistent with those presented in earlier reviews by Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988). In their conclusions, Andrade et al. suggest that 
one of explanations for the contradictory evidence of acquirer firm’s post-merger 
performance is the existence of various conflicting underlying motivations behind the 
merger decision. The next part is devoted to review the literature of merger and 
acquisition motives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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II. Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions
Previous studies on mergers and acquisitions have identified several main motives 
of mergers and acquisitions including (1) market timing, (2) response to industry shocks,
(3) agency cost and hubris, and (4) synergy. The theories behind these motives are based 
on different sets of assumptions and predict different impacts on post-acquisition 
performance o f the acquirer.
A. Market timing
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) (SV, henceforth) introduced a model of mergers and 
acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of both the target and acquiring firms. 
The basic assumption of the model is that the market is irrational and firms are 
incorrectly valued. Managers do not act on shareholders value and they take advantage of 
share value mispricing through merger activity. The SV model explains who acquires 
whom, the choice of the payment medium, the valuation consequences of mergers and 
the merger waves.
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) test the SV model and gives the 
model significant empirical support. Dong et al also contrast the Q-hypothesis (Brainard 
and Tobin 1968) with the SV misvaluation hypothesis and find evidence that the Q- 
hypothesis is more strongly supported in the pre-1990 period and misvaluation 
hypothesis is better in the 1990-2000 period. In their study, the two proxies used to 
measure market misvaluation include the price-to-book value of equity (P/B) ratio and 
the price to residual income value (P/V) ratio. According to Dong et al., P/V is less 
controversial because it does not measure misvaluation based on historical cost. PV is a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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better measure because residual income value is a forward-looking information given by 
analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. They study a long sample period from 1978 to 
2000, covering both the pre-1990 and the 1990-2000 merger waves. Some of their main 
findings include (1) acquirers are more highly overvalued than targets; (2) more 
overvalued targets are more often be purchased by equity than by cash; (3) high-valuation 
acquirers are more likely to use stock rather than cash in acquiring targets and they also 
tend to pay higher premium especially when stock is the payment method; (4) 
acquisitions by overvalued acquirers are typically followed by lower post-merger 
abnormal returns.
Although different from the SV model regarding assumptions, the model of 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) have similar predictions about the effect of 
market misvaluation on merger waves. In the RKV model, managers of both the target 
and acquirer firms are rational, however the target lacks information about the value of 
the equity offered by the acquirer and the value of the merger to the acquirer due to the 
market’s misvaluations of the stocks of the target and acquirer. Market misvaluations in 
the RKV model have two components -  a firm-specific component and a market-wide 
component. Acquirer firm managers know the stand-alone value of their firms and also 
the potential value of merging with the target firm. Target firm managers know the stand­
alone value of their firms, however, do not know the components of the misvaluation, 
and therefore find it difficult to assess the offer. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and 
Viswanathan (2005, henceforth RKRV) empirically test and find support for the 
predictions of the RKV and SV models. RKRV develop a model that decomposes M/B 
ratio into two components, market to true value and true value to book value. The first
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component measures market misvaluation due to either irrational behavior or information 
asymmetry that could be firm-specific or industry-wide. The second component measures 
growth opportunities without being contaminated by the mispricing part. They perform 
sector-level cross-sectional regressions of firm-level market equities on firm 
fundamentals each year to derive a time series of the components. RKKV show that the 
regressions can explain 80% to 94% of the within-sector variation in firm-level market 
value. They then use the resulting regression coefficients to generate measures of 
intrinsic values. According to them, “these coefficients have natural interpretations as 
time-varying valuation multiples and account for variation in the market’s expectations of 
returns and growth over time and across industries.” Using this breakdown, they come up 
with main findings. Firstly, they find that acquiring firms are valued significantly higher 
than targets. Secondly, a large part of the difference in M/B between acquirers and targets 
is due to differences in firm-specific misvaluation. Roughly 60% of the acquirer’s M/B is 
attributable to firm-specific misevaluation, while almost none of the target’s M/B is 
attributable to firm-specific misvaluation. Thirdly, acquirers and targets mostly belong to 
the sectors with high sector error. Therefore, they seem to share a common misvaluation 
component. Fourthly, cash targets are undervalued while equity targets are slightly 
overvalued. Similarly, cash acquirers are less overvalued than equity acquirers. Next, in 
examining the long-run value-to-book, low M/B firms buy high M/B firms. The long-run 
value-to-book component of M/B for targets is three to five times higher than that for 
acquirers. And, misvaluation explains about 15% of acquisition activity at the sector 
level. Thus, neoclassical factors such as industry productivity shocks also play an 
important role in explaining merger wave. Finally, they find unambiguous evidence that
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misvaluation drives merger waves. During merger waves, highly overvalued bidders 
account for 65% of the merger activities. RKRV, therefore, conclude that “while 
neoclassical explanations are important for understanding merger activity at the sector 
level, misvaluation is critical for understanding who buys whom, regardless of whether 
the merger occurs during a time when productivity shocks could have caused a spike in 
merger activity.”
B. Response to Industry shocks
Neoclassical theories see mergers as an efficiency-improving response to various 
industry shocks and predict that mergers increase profitability. An implication of 
neoclassical theories is that the value of firms will increase if  firms positively respond to 
economic industry shocks by involving in either acquisition or divestiture activities. 
Mergers have been related to several types of industry shocks in the literature. Coase 
(1937) identifies technology is a major determinant of firm size, implying that 
technological change is a motive of mergers and acquisitions. Jarrell, Brickley, and 
Netter (1988) posit that mergers are motivated by antitrust deregulation, innovations in 
takeover financing, and improved skills and strategies of implementing merger process. 
Weston and Chung (1990) observe that takeover activities in 1980s have been high in 
industries undergoing deregulation, experiencing oil price shocks and otherwise facing 
structural alterations. Jensen (1993) also specifies that input prices influence merger 
activity, as shown by the merger activities in the 1980s in response to the energy price 
volatility in 1970s. Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that relatively broad-based
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economic factors, rather than state laws and firm-specific antitakeover amendments, 
reduced the number of takeovers.
Studying industry-level takeovers and restructuring activities across 51 industries 
with a sample size of 1064 firms during the 1982-1989 period, Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) find significant differences in both the rate and time-series clustering of these 
activities. On average, half of the takeovers and restructurings in an industry take place in 
one-fourth of the sample period. They then link the takeover activity with specific 
industry economic shocks, including deregulation, energy shocks, foreign competition 
and financing innovations and find that the link is maintained significantly for all of the 
shocks, especially those for deregulations and financing innovations. Overall, the study 
documents evidence that during 1980s most of the takeover activity was driven by broad 
based fundamental economic factors.
Mulherin and Boone (2000) study the acquisition and divestiture activity of a 
sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries between 1990 and 1999. They find clustering in 
both acquisitions and divestitures, which is consistent with the notion that economic 
change is a source of the activity. Besides, they also study the announcement effects of 
the two forms of restructuring and find that both acquisitions and divestitures in the 
1990s increase the wealth of shareholders. They conclude that the symmetric positive 
wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are consistent with the explanation that 
synergy is the motive for acquisitions and divestitures and are not consistent with non- 
synergistic explanations such as entrenchment, empire building, and hubris.
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Andrade and Stafford (2004) study merger activities over the period 1970-1994 
and find that mergers play a dual economic role. They find firms involved in mergers 
increase their capital base and respond more to good growth prospects. On the other 
hand, they also find that firms involved in within-industry mergers are negatively related 
to the industry capacity utilization during the 1970s and 1980s, which is consistent with 
the view that mergers are an effective means for industries with excess capacity to 
rationalize and induce exit.
Harford (2005) examines and compares the two explanations for merger waves, 
industry shocks and market timing. He studies the industry-level merger waves in 1980s 
and 1990s and finds support for the neoclassical model with a modification to include a 
role for capital liquidity. He concludes that economic, regulatory or technological shocks 
cause industry merger waves. However, shocks propagate a wave only when there is 
sufficient capital liquidity to accommodate the necessary transactions. This macro-level 
liquidity component causes industry merger waves to cluster even if industry shocks do 
not. He also emphasizes that the relation between asset values and merger activity, which 
suggests that mergers reflects the capital liquidity effect rather than misvaluation effects. 
Although Hafford does not deny evidence that mergers are driven by managers timing the 
market, he posits that mergers are not the cause of waves. Rather, aggregate merger 
waves are caused by the clustering of shock-driven industry merger waves, not by 
attempts to time the market.
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C. Agency cost and hubris
Corporate managers are hypothesized to put their personal interests ahead of those 
of firm owners in the models of agency cost and hubris. Though there are slight 
differences between the two hypotheses in terms of the behavior of the corporate 
manager, the two hypotheses are similar in predicting a value destroying effect of 
mergers. The agency cost hypothesis suggests that corporate managers perform takeovers 
because they want to enhance their personal welfare by expanding the firm size. Such 
actions result in agency costs that reduce the total value of the acquiring firm. The hubris 
hypothesis argues that corporate managers who are motivated by their managerial pride 
make mistakes in evaluating target firms, and engage in acquisitions even when there is 
no synergy (Roll 1986). This hypothesis presumes that synergy is zero or even negative, 
and the merger will result in a redistribution of wealth between the target and acquirer, or 
a reduction of both parties’ values.
Empirical studies on mergers have documented supportive findings for both the 
agency cost and hubris hypotheses. Dodd (1980) found that the return to the acquirer firm 
is significantly negative following takeover announcements. Malatesta (1983) finds that 
mergers are value-creating transactions for target firms but value-destroying transactions 
for acquiring firms and concludes that takeovers are motivated by agency cost. Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) show that larger firms, which are more likely run by 
hubris-filled managers, tend to offer higher takeover premium and are more likely to 
complete a takeover than their smaller counterparts. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) seek 
for an explanation of the large premium paid for targets in acquisitions. They study a 
sample of 106 large acquisitions and found that the size of the premium paid is highly
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associated with four indicators of CEO hubris including the acquirer’s recent 
performance, recent media praise for the CEO, a measure o f the CEO's self-importance, 
and a composite factor of these 3 variables. On average, the study finds a significant loss 
in the acquirer’s shareholder value following an acquisition, and the greater the CEO 
hubris and acquisition premium, the greater the shareholders’ losses. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) use a database of 330 tender offers made during 1963-1988 to 
distinguish three motives of takeovers, including synergy, agency cost, and hubris 
motives. It is found that takeovers yield positive total gains in 75 percent of the sample. 
In a subsample that includes only firms with positive total gains, targets’ gains increase 
with the total gain, indicating that the synergy motive dominates. However, in another 
subsample that includes only firms with negative total gains, the correlation of targets’ 
gains and the total gain is negative, indicating that the dominating motive is agency cost. 
There is also evidence that hubris exists in the positive total gain subsample. Berkovitch 
and Narayanan admit that “while synergy is the reason for the majority of the takeovers, 
there is strong evidence that many takeovers are motivated by agency and hubris.”
D. Synergy
The synergy hypothesis assumes that managers act to increase firm value. This 
theory posits that firms would engage in acquisitions only if  they result in gains to 
shareholders of the acquirer and target. The theory therefore predicts a positive post­
merger performance. In a comprehensive review of the literature on the market for 
corporate control, Jensen and Ruback (1983) show evidence that corporate takeovers 
generate positive gains, in which target firm shareholders benefit and bidding firm
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shareholders do not lose. Later, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) confirm the basic 
conclusions of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and state that “the premiums in takeovers 
represent real wealth gains and are not simply wealth redistributions (between targets and 
acquirers).”
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine post-acquisition performance of the 
fifty largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. They find that merged firms 
experienced significant improvements in asset productivity relative to their industries, 
leading to higher operating cash flow returns. This performance improvement is 
particularly strong for firms with highly overlapping businesses. Also, there is a strong 
positive relation between post-merger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal 
stock returns at merger announcements, indicating that expectations of economic 
improvements underlie the equity revaluations of merging firms.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) study a sample of tender offers that occurred in 
the period from 1963 to 1984 and document a combined value increase for the target and 
acquiring firms by an average of 7.4 percent. They conclude that “successful tender 
offers generate synergistic gains and lead to a more efficient allocation of corporate 
resources” (p. 13). Mulherin and Boone (2000) analyze a sample of 281 takeovers from 
1990s and find that the positive combined return of the acquirer and target is related 
directly to the relative size of the takeover. They conclude that the results are consistent 
with the synergy theory and are inconsistent with models based on management 
entrenchment, empire building and managerial hubris.
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Song and Walkling (2000) find that stock prices of firms in a given industry tend 
to rise following the announcement of a takeover, presumably in expectation of other 
takeovers to occur. They posit that mergers become a tool for industries to generate 
synergies by consolidating and restructuring. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that 
acquisitions on average result in productive gains for the assets acquired, and that buyers 
tend to be relatively more productive firms.
E. Research motivations
Existing empirical studies on post-merger performance have documented 
contradictory findings of the acquirer’s performance after the merger. Empirical findings 
show that the firm value of the acquirer could increase, decrease, or remain the same. 
There are several questions to be addressed as a result.
Firstly, the market timing theory posits that the acquirer takes advantage of the 
market’s mispricing of its share value by issuing over-valued stocks to acquire the target. 
Naturally, it leads to a critical question that whether investors will react to the merger by 
correcting the share value overvaluation after the merger announcement? If they do react 
negatively, do negative returns after merger announcements documented in the literature 
represent evidence of a market correction of the overvalued stock and not evidence that 
mergers are a value-destroying activity?
Secondly, the industry shock-responding theory posits that firms in the same 
industry would react to common shocks by performing mergers or divestitures to reap 
benefits of the shocks and increase their firm values. It leads to the question that whether 
a decision to merge receives support from the market also? If yes, is the increase in share
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value persistent over time to reflect the time required to digest a structural change? Vice 
versa, if  the market does not prefer the decision to merge, do we see a reduction in share 
value even though it is intended to reap some benefits of common industry shocks?
Finally, agency cost and hubris theories posit that managers act against 
maximizing shareholder wealth either because they want to increase their personal wealth 
or because they are overconfident. This leads to the question whether investors recognize 
mergers as a value destruction decision or are confounded by mergers’ value-creating 
potentials in their reactions to merger announcements. Then, can we find evidence for 
synergy being the motive for mergers?
It is plausible that a decision to merge has more than one motive. The 
contradictory effects of some of the motives on the acquiring firms’ performance offset 
each other and render it difficult to make conclusive remarks. In addition, the use of 
incomparable methodologies and different measures add to the problem just mentioned. 
Hence, it makes sense for us to use a single method that can simultaneously decipher 
various motives of merger decisions and trace the effect of each motive on the post-event 
performance of the acquiring firms.
III. Decomposition of M/B ratio
In an effort to explore the misvaluation of share value empirically, RKRV (2005) 
develop a model in which M/B ratio is decomposed into three parts including fiim- 
specific error, time-series sector error and long-run-value-to-book. They argue that if  a 
perfect measure of value exists, that is, if  the market can perfectly anticipate future
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growth opportunities, discount rates, and cash flows, there would be no pricing error to 
contaminate M/B ratio, and the long-run-value-to-book should be equal to M/B ratio. 
According to the RKRV method, M/B ratio in logarithmic form can be decomposed into 
three parts as follows.
m - b  = ( m - v x) + (vx- v 2) + (v2 - b )  (1)
where m and b are market and book values of equity in logarithmic forms respectively. 
The first part, ( m - v i )  is the difference between the market value of equity and the firm’s 
fundamental value estimated by industry averages at time t, vy. That is, this component 
measures firm-specific deviations from valuations implied by contemporaneous sector 
multiples. RKRV suggests that this part captures the firm’s idiosyncratic misvaluation. 
The second part, (v/ -  V2) is the difference between the firm’s estimated fundamental 
value measured by industry averages at time t, v/, and the firm’s estimated fundamental 
value measured by long-run industry averages, vj. This difference arises when 
contemporaneous multiples differ from long-run multiples. RKRV posits that sectors, or 
entire market, could be overheated at certain time, and thus that firms in the same sector 
could share a common misvaluation component. The third part, (V2 -  b), is the difference 
between firm’s estimated fundamental value measured by long-run industry averages, y?, 
and the book value of the firm, b. Industry averages are coefficient parameters of cross- 
sectional regression of stock value on fundamental factors. RKRV suggests that this part 
captures long-run growth opportunities.
RKRV argue that if  market is potentially biased in valuing, or if  information is 
asymmetric, then the first two parts capture misvaluation. If the market price deviates
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from the true value, then the first two parts will be positive in periods of overvaluation 
and negative in periods of undervaluation. Of the two parts capturing misvaluation, (m -  
vj) captures firm-specific mispricing and (vj -  v )̂ captures mispricing that is shared by all 
firms in a given sector or market. Using the three break-downs of M/B ratio, RKRV find 
supportive evidence for the correlated misvaluation theory (RKV 2004) and the irrational 
stock market theory (SV 2003) which argues that mergers and acquisitions are driven by 
market misvaluation.
The M/B ratio components of RKRV are empirically capable of tracing the 
sources of mispricing. Therefore, the method may also help to trace the implicit motives 
behind mergers and acquisitions.




A. Prediction of the market timing hypothesis
In the market timing models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004), overvaluation of the acquirer’s equity leads to incentives to acquire 
another firm. The incentive to acquire is positively related to the amount of 
overvaluation. The literature reveals ample evidence that the overvaluation of the 
acquirer’s equity is particularly strong when the acquisition is paid using stock instead of 
cash. A natural implication of the market timing argument is that the market will correct 
its overvaluation eventually. We argue that the market will correct its mistake quickly 
after the merger announcement as investors receive more information about the acquirer. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that after the merger, investors will recognize that they have 
overvalued the shares of the acquirer before the event and therefore will correct the 
mispricing immediately. This leads to the first hypothesis followed
Hypothesis 1: In stock mergers, firm-specific mispricing is corrected after the 
announcement.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that overvalued acquirers prefer to use 
overvalued stocks to pay for acquisitions. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the market 
does not respond in the same manner to mergers with different methods of payment. 
They find that acquirers making cash tender offers earn positive long-run abnormal 
returns, but those making stock acquisitions earn negative long-run abnormal returns. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find this pattern of returns remains even after controlling for
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size and book-to-market ratio. In other words, investors quickly devalue the equity of the 
acquirer when it is a stock acquisition. These results imply that market timing is more 
likely related to stock mergers. Therefore, we expect to see a less significant valuation 
correction after a cash acquisition announcement. The developed hypothesis is
Hypothesis 2: Cash acquirers experience less firm-specific mispricing correction than 
stock acquirers.
B. Predictions of neoclassical theories
Neoclassical theories argue that industry shocks drive merger activity, which not 
only leads to waves of mergers (Weston and Chung (1990), Jensen (1993), Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996)), but also to waves of divestitures (Coase (1937), Mulherin and Boone 
(2000)). Typically, a firm responds to shocks such as structural or regulatory changes in 
the industry by engaging in mergers and acquisitions in order to better reposition itself 
among the competitors. A general assumption is that the firm’s response is value- 
increasing. Thus, an implication of neoclassical theories is that the shareholder value of 
the acquiring firm will increase after the acquisition. Therefore, the hypothesis is
Hypothesis 3: Given industry shocks or aggregate shocks proposing merger and 
acquisition, industry-specific mispricing increases after the merger and acquisition 
announcement
C. Predictions of the synergy, agency cost and hubris theories
Synergy theory assumes that managers act to maximize shareholder value and 
therefore posits that firms would engage in acquisitions only if  they result in gains to
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shareholders of both sides (Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988, Jensen and Ruback 1983 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988, Song and Walking 2000). Therefore, the developed 
hypothesis is
Hypothesis 4: Long-run-value of equity for the acquiring firm increases after the 
acquisition announcement
Agency cost theories predicts a destruction of share value after the merger event 
because corporate managers act to increase their own welfare at the expense of 
shareholders (Malatesta 1983, Walkling and Long 1984, Lewellen, Loderer and 
Rosenfeld, 1985). Despite incentives can be used to align managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) show that agency costs persist when 
managerial ownership is between 5% and 20% of the total shares outstanding. Thus, 
agency costs are considerable in the corporate arena. On the other hand, the hubris theory 
posits that mergers do not create value and that the merger decision results from acquirer 
managers’ mistakes in estimating gains (Roll 1986). Thus, the agency cost and hubris 
theories and the synergy theory predict contradictory effects on the long-run-value-to- 
book. Therefore, a rejection of hypothesis 4 is an evidence for supporting the agency cost 
/hubris theory. If the long-run value of equity of the acquirer decreases after the merger, 
the agency cost/hubris theory is supported.





Completed merger and acquisition deals involving publicly traded US acquirers 
and targets with deal values larger than $10 million are collected from the Thomson 
Financial Mergers and Acquisitions database for the period 1984 to 2004. This yields a 
sample of 7,199 acquisitions with information on announcement date, effective date, 
method of payment, deal value, and proportion of acquirer’s ex post ownership. Stock 
price data for all the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq US firms are collected from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. Relevant financial variables are collected 
from the Compustat data files, including 4-digit SIC codes, fiscal year-end dates and 
accounting data.
We use the method suggested by RKRV (2005) in merging data from the three 
sources. First, for calculating M/B ratio, we match fiscal year-end data from Compustat 
with CRSP market values occurring three months afterward. This method takes into 
account the fact that firms have different fiscal year end dates and ensure that the price 
data reflects the corresponding year’s accounting information. Then, we associate this 
CRSP/Compustat data with a merger announcement. The annual market-to-book ratios 
before and after a merger announcement are compared to examine the change of market 
valuation in the long run and verify ex post the motives of the merger. This approach of 
merging the three sets of data gives us a final sample of 3,520 completed merger events 
involving 1,973 acquiring firms.
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Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of the sampled mergers by year and 
payment method over our sample period. Our acquisition sample covers the merger 
waves between 1985 and 1989 and between 1994 and 2004. Of the 3520 events, 26.7 
percent are stock acquisitions, 40.39 percent are cash offers, and 32.90 percent are other 
payment method acquisitions. Cash is the dominant payment method for acquisitions 
before 1990, stock is used more often after 1990. Stock acquisitions in 1990s double that 
in 1980s. Mean deal value in 1990s almost doubles that in 1980s while the median deal 
values of these two periods are comparable.
<Table 1 is about here>
Applying the methodology of RKRV, we group firms into 12 industries based on 
the 12-industry classifications recommended by Fama and French. Market value of a firm 
is the CRSP market equity plus Compustat book assets (item 6) minus deferred taxes 
(item 74) minus book equity (item 60). We also obtain the following size-related 
measures: Total Plant, Property and Equipment (item 8), Total Cash (item 1), Long-term 
debt (item 9), Capital Expenditures (item 128), and Net Income (item 172). Return on 
Assets and Equity are calculated by dividing net income in year t by assets (item 6) or 
book equity (item 60) in year t-1. For leverage measures, we obtain the Current Ratio 
(items 4/5), Quick Ratio [items (4-3)/5], Market Leverage (1-market equity/market value 
of firm), and Book Leverage (1-book equity/total book assets).
<Table 2 is about here>
For comparison purpose, Table 2 reports selected firm characteristics of acquirers 
and those not involved in mergers. Outliers are deleted from the sample. Observations are
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required to have positive book value of equity, ROA and ROE greater than -200% and - 
2000% respectively, M/B ratio below 100 and market equity larger than $10 million. 
Statistics for non-mergers are aggregate average for the whole period from 1985 to 2004. 
For the acquirer sample, statistics reported are for the year before the event. On average, 
acquiring firms have higher book and market values of assets and equity. Acquirers also 
have higher investments in plants, property and equipments. They have higher capital 
expenditures, more long-term debt and higher net incomes. Acquiring firms also report 
higher ROA, ROE and M/B ratios. Overall, acquiring firms perform better than non­
mergers. These firm characteristics resemble those found by RKRV.
II. Methodology of decomposing the market to book ratio
We follow RKRV (2005) in decomposing the market-to-book ratio, in which the 
market-to-book ratio is decomposed into three components, expressed in logarithmic 
form as follows.
m - b  = ( m - v l) + (vl - v 2) + (v2 - b )  (1)
m and b are market and book values of equity in logarithmic forms respectively. The first 
component, (m -  v/) is the difference between the market value of equity and the firm’s 
fundamental value estimated by industry averages at time t. The second component, (v; -  
V2) is the difference between the firm’s estimated fundamental value measured by 
industry averages at time t and the firm’s estimated fundamental value measured by long- 
run industry averages. The third component (v  ̂ -  b) is the difference between firm’s 
estimated fundamental value measured by long-run industry averages and the book value
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of the firm. Industry averages are coefficient parameters of cross-sectional regression of 
stock value on fundamental factors.
In RKRV, three regression models for estimating market value from fundamental 
factors are used. In this study, we apply the third model which, according to RKRV, is 
the most comprehensive and effective in estimating market equity.
mu = a ojt + <*i A  + a 2jtniu + a 3 JtI (<0) (ini)u + a ijtLevit + e, (2)
where mu is the logarithm of market value of stock i at time t. bu is the logarithm of book 
value of equity of firm i at time t. niu is the logarithm of net income of firm i at time t. 
I(<o) is a dummy variable, taking value of one for negative-net-income firms and of zero 
for other firms. Levit is the market leverage ratio of firm i at time t. f, is regression 
residual. The estimated fundamental values are then applied to calculate the three 
components of market-to-book ratio.
mit -  bit = [mit -  v{0it; a Jt)] + [v(<9„; a jt) -  v{9it; a j )] + [v(6it \a j )~  bit ] (3)
mit and bit are logarithms of market value and book value of equity of firm i at time t, 
respectively. On the right-hand side of equation (3), the first component is the difference 
between market value, mih and the firm’s fundamental value which is estimated by 
industry multiples and the firm’s fundamentals ( a jt and 9it) at time t. This component
measures firm-specific mispricing due to short-run over- or under- valuation when the 
firm is hot or cold relative to the industry. The second component is the difference 
between a firm’s fundamental value estimated by time-t industry multiples and firm
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fundamentals ( a jt and 0it) and the fundamental value estimated by long-run industry
multiples and firm fundamentals { a } and 0it) at time t. This component measures
industry-specific mispricing due to short-run over- or under- valuation when the industry 
at time t is hot or cold relative to the industry’s long-term fundamentals. The third 
component, v(0u; a j ) - b , is the difference between a firm’s fundamental value estimated
by long-run industry multiples and firm fundamentals (a j  and 6U ) and the book value of
equity, 6,. This component measures the long-run value of the firm. A change in the value 
of third component implies long-run value creation or destruction of the merger. To 
decipher motives of mergers, we examine changes in the three components’ corrections 
over one-, two- and three-year windows after the merger. The corrections of the three 
components are formulated as follows.
Firm-specific mispricing correction = [mi{t+a) - v ( 0 i(l+a);aj{t+a))\ - [mu -v (0 it;ajt)]
Industry-specific mispricing correction = [v{0i(t+a); a j(t+a)) -  v(0i(l+a); a ,)] - [v(6it; a jt) -  v{0it; a })]
Long-run value creation/destruction = [v(0i{t+a)\c ( j ) -b j(t+a)] - [v(0u;a j ) - bit]
In the equations, subscript t denotes market value day of equity before merger 
events, (t+a) denotes market value days of one, two and three years after merger events, 
with a taking values of 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
If the firm-specific mispricing correction is negative, the market timing 
hypothesis is supported because the negative change implies that the firm-specific 
mispricing is corrected when investors understand the acquirer was too hot relative to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
industry before the event. If industry-specific mispricing correction is positive, the 
industry-shock response hypothesis is supported. That is, the market now believes that 
the acquirer was too cold relative to the industry and that the merger would reap the 
benefit of industry shocks such as deregulation or technology advancements. If the long- 
run value is positive, long-run fundamental value is created by synergy effects of the 
merger. The synergy hypothesis is thus supported and agency and hubris hypotheses are 
rejected.




Statistics of M/B ratio and its logarithmic form of acquirers one year before and 
up to three years after the merger are reported in Table 3. Firms that are involved in more 
than one merger in the sample period are grouped together as active acquirers. On 
average, M/B ratio of all acquirers decreases gradually from 4.01 before the merger to 
3.59 over the one, two, and three years intervals after the merger. In logarithm form, 
(logM -  logB), or (m-b), slightly reduces after the merger. All the t-statistics are 
significant for one-time acquirers and active acquirers. These results generally suggest 
that mergers destroy shareholder value in the long run.
<Table 3 is about here.>
We run regression (2) for each of the 12-industry classification groups and report 
results in Table 4. The average R-square is 84% and most of the coefficient parameters 
are significant at 1% except for the coefficient of negative net income. The signs of the 
coefficients are in general consistent with market valuation rationales. That is, the 
regression loadings show that the market value of equity increases with the book value of 
equity, net income and reduces with negative net income and market leverage. The 
results show that the regression coefficients are reliable for forecasting the market value 
of equity.
<Table 4 is about here>
We then use the coefficients from regression (2) to estimate market values of 
equity of the acquirer based on short-run and long-run industry averages. After that, we
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decompose the market-to-book ratio into three components: mit - v{0jt; a jt) ,  firm-specific
mispricing; v{0it;a jt) - v(0it;a j) ,  time-series industry mispricing; and v(0u;ccj)- bu,
long-run-value to book-value. Corrections of these three components one, two, and three 
years after mergers are reported in Table 5. Panel A reports the market correction over 
the three event windows for the whole merger sample. Panel B compares the magnitude 
of market corrections between acquirers and non-merger firms. For the sample of non­
merger firms, firm-specific mispricing, industry-specific mispricing and long-run-value 
to book are computed for each calendar year. Changes in the three components over the 
three windows are compared on a yearly basis with the sample of acquiring firms. In 
Panels C to H of Table 5, changes in the three components of M/B ratio are reported with 
the sample of acquirers grouped according to the frequency of merger, method of 
payment, proportion of shares acquired, M/B ratio, market value of acquirers, and 
industry sectors.
<Table 5 is about here>
I. Evidence of the market timing motive
For the entire sample of acquirers, the firm-specific mispricing significantly and 
consistently reduces in one, two, and three years after the event. Specifically, in Panel A. 
of Table 5, the firm-specific mispricing reduces by 0.058 in one year, 0.160 in two years, 
and 0.172 in three years after the merger. Panel B shows that corrections of the firm- 
specific mispricing of acquirers are significantly larger than those of non-merged firms 
over the three-year interval after mergers. On average, the correction of the firm-specific
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mispricing is 0.038 larger than that of the non-merged firms in one year, 0.141 in two 
years, and 0.134 in three years. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1 that market 
timing is a motive for acquisitions. The result is consistent with the implication that when 
the market recognizes it has overvalued the acquirer’s share value, it corrects the mistake 
that has raised the value of the acquirer too much relative to the industry short-run 
averages. In untabulated results, we tested Hypothesis 1 by excluding finance and utility 
industries and found similar results with a sample of 2,339 events.
As reported in Panel C of Table 5, we can see that the firm-specific mispricing of 
one-time acquirers reduces by 0.111 in one year, 0.166 in two years, and 0.224 in three 
years after the event and all are significant at the 1% level. For the active-acquirer group, 
firm-specific error reduces by 0.040 in one year, 0.158 in two years, and 0.155 in three 
years after the event. The difference between these two groups is not statistically 
significant.
In testing Hypothesis 2 to see if  cash and stock payers experience similar 
reductions of firm-specific error, we split the sample of acquirers into three groups based 
on the method of payment: cash, stock, and other-method payers. The other-method 
payers include those using mixed and unknown payment methods. The results are 
reported in Panel D of Table 5. The results show that stock payers experience significant 
reductions of the first component in all the three event-windows after mergers, while cash 
payers experience a reduction of firm-specific mispricing significantly only in the first 
two years. The magnitude of changes in the firm-specific mispricing for stock payers 
ranges from -0.070 to -0.473, and is much larger than that for the cash payer sample, 
which ranges from -0.039 to -0.046. The difference between the stock and cash payers is
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significant at the 1% level. This result shows a strong support for Hypothesis 2 that cash 
payers experience much less error correction than stock payers. The result implies that 
market timing motive is less dominant in cash acquisitions, and that the market 
recognizes such implication and does not impose a large value correction because the 
stock value of the cash payer is not as overvalued as that of the stock payer before the 
merger.
To further confirm the market timing hypothesis, we divide the sample into five 
quintiles based on the market-to-book ratio and compare the corrections of firm-specific 
mispricing between quintile one (value stocks) and quintile 5 (glamour stocks). Results 
are reported in Panel F of Table 5. The results show that firm-specific mispricing 
corrections are significantly larger for glamour firms than value firms. Corrections of 
glamour acquirers’ firm-specific mispricing are 0.374, 0.366, and 0.438 more than those 
of value acquirers over the three-year interval after mergers. The differences are all 
significant at the 1% level.
We also divide the sample into five quintiles based on the market value of the 
acquirer and report the results in Panel G of Table 5. We find that large firms experience 
larger firm-specific mispricing corrections than small firms. However, the difference 
between the large and small firms quintiles is insignificant in year one. The results imply 
that the market believes that the pre-event overvaluation is more serious for glamour or 
large firms and therefore correct more strongly accordingly. Overall, the empirical results 
on firm-specific mispricing correction strongly suggest that acquirers’ stocks are 
overvalued before mergers and that market timing is a likely motive of merger decision.
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II. Evidence of the response to industry-shock motive
In searching for evidence of the industry-shock responding motive, we look at the 
correction of the industry-specific mispricing. In Panel A of Table 5, for the whole 
sample, industry-specific mispricing increases after the event and are significant at the 
1% level over the two and three years windows, but is insignificant one year after 
mergers. Specifically, industry-specific mispricing increases by 0.012, 0.050 and 0.080 in 
one, two and three years after mergers. It indicates that the market likes the merger and 
believes the acquisition is a good response to the industry shocks in the period between 
1985 and 2004. Nevertheless, in Panel B of Table 5, when compared with the non­
merged firms’ industry-specific mispricing corrections, the corrections of acquirers are 
not significantly different from those of the non-merged firms. Also, the signs of 
differences are not consistent. This implies that industry-wide overheating is found across 
firms in all industries between 1985 and 2004, and not only particularly for the merged 
firms.
The increase of industry-specific mispricing is consistently found in various sub­
category analyses such as those sorted by the frequency of mergers ( Panel C), by the 
method of payments (Panel D), by the proportion of acquired shares (Panel E), by M/B 
ratio (Panel F), and by the acquirer’s market value of equity (Panel G). This indicates that 
the market likes the mergers and therefore heightens the industry-specific mispricing 
accordingly.
We then check for corrections of industry-specific mispricing across industries 
and report the results in Panel H of Table 5. About one third of the industries show that
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industry-specific mispricing significantly increases after mergers, especially in the 
business equipment, finance, chemicals and consumer non-durables industries. This is 
consistent with the observations of other researchers that mergers take place in industries 
experiencing input price and deregulation shocks (Mulherin and Boone, 2000). The 
business equipment, finance, chemicals and consumer non-durables industries had 
considerable amounts of price and regulatory shocks over the sample period, and mergers 
in these industries account for 30 to 57 percent of the aggregate merger and acquisition 
activities. Acquirers in the energy industry, however, experience a decline in industry- 
specific mispricing. This suggests that the mergers are not expected in the energy 
industry. This again resembles the documented evidence by Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
which shows that energy industries, including natural gas, electric utility, and petroleum 
contribute only from 17 to 27 percent of the aggregate merger activity. Generally, the 
results suggest that mergers and acquisitions are valued by the market. For other 
industries, most of the increases in industry-specific mispricing are not statistically 
significant. The analysis of industry-specific mispricing correction suggests that industry- 
responding motive might be a motive for merger and acquisition.
III. Synergy, agency cost, or hubris?
A. Long-run value to book value
In Panel A of Table 5, the results show that the long-run value-to-book 
component insignificantly increases by 0.009 in one year, significantly reduces by -0.019 
in two years at the 10% level, and significantly reduces by -0.081 in three years after 
mergers at the 1% level. However, when compared to non-merger firms, the long-run
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value-to-book of acquirers is significantly higher in the one- and two-year windows and 
insignificantly lower in the three-year window. In the one-year and two-year windows, 
long-run values of acquirers are 0.027 and 0.028 higher than those of non-merged firms 
at the 1% and 5% level. In the three-year window, the long-run value-to-book of 
acquirers is slightly and insignificantly lower than non-merged firms by -0.012. This 
evidence shows that while the long-run value of the acquirer falls after mergers, it falls 
relatively less than non-merged firms. This implies that mergers improve long-run value 
of acquiring firms relative to non-merged companies and this observation supports 
Hypothesis 4. The result is consistent with the predictions of the SV model that mergers 
(even if  overvalued) made by overvalued acquirers are better than doing nothing. To 
provide more evidence of relative improvements of acquirers, we compare the annual 
long-run value-to-book of acquirers and non-merged firms. Results are reported in 
Appendix A, Panel A. 3. Results show that 53 percent of the long-run value-to-book of 
acquirers is higher than the long-run value- to-book of non-merged firms.
To examine the factors that could negatively affect long-run value of acquirers, 
we split the sample into two sub-samples, one-time and active acquirers. The results in 
Panel C of table 5 show that both one-time and active acquirers insignificantly gain long- 
run value in one year, but lose in two and three years. In comparison, active acquirers 
lose long-run-value relatively less than one-time acquirers. In general, the results show 
that mergers and acquisitions are more likely a value-destroying decision than a value- 
creating activity for one-time acquirers. Panel D of Table 5 shows that stock payers 
experience significantly larger decreases of long-run value than cash payers. In one, two 
and three years after the event, stock payers lose 0.026, 0.084, and 0.153 of the long-run
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value to book value, while cash payers gain 0.021 in one year and lose only 0.007 and 
0.076 of the long-run value in two and three years after mergers. These results show that 
acquirers choose to pay stock for value-destroying acquisitions and cash for value- 
creating acquisitions, which implies that acquirers can foresee the effect of their 
acquisitions on the long-run values of their shares. When acquirers can foresee the 
negative outcome of stock acquisitions and choose to proceed with them, it is conceivable 
that stock acquisition is driven by market timing.
To investigate the effect of the size of acquisition on the reduction of long-run 
value, we split the sample based on the proportion of shares acquired. Of the whole 
sample of 3520 mergers, 869 mergers, or about 25 percent, involve acquisitions of less 
than 10% of the target’s shares; 675 mergers, or about 20 percent, involve acquisitions of 
more than 10% and less than 100% of the target’s shares; and 1976 mergers, or about 55 
percent of the whole sample, involve acquisitions of 100% of the target. Thus, we divide 
our sample into three groups based on the size of the acquisition, less than 10%, more 
than 10% but less than 100%, and 100%. Results are reported in Panel G of Table 5. All 
the three groups experience insignificant changes that are similar in size in the first two 
event windows. However, the change in the 3-year window is significantly negative for 
the two later groups, that is, the group acquiring more than 10% but less than 100% of 
targets and the group acquiring 100% of targets. The 100%-acquisition group has a 
decline of -0.124 that is twice as large as that of the 10%-to-less-than-100%-acquisition 
group -0.078. The fact that acquirers taking 100% share-acquisition are more aggressive 
than those taking partial acquisition implies that these aggressive acquirers involve more 
in empire building. The result is consistent with implications that mergers that are more
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driven by empire building reduce long-term value of the firm more significantly. Also, 
firm-specific mispricing correction is largest for the 100%-acquisition group, which 
implies that for this group of acquirers, the manager uses overvalued equity to pursue 
acquisitions that are driven by managerial self-interest or hubris.
We also look at the effect on long-run value of glamour and value acquirers. 
Results are reported in Panel F of Table 5. Value acquirers experience a significant 
reduction of long-run value over the three event windows. The declines are -0.053 in one 
year, -0.218 in two years, and -0.167 in three years. Glamour acquirers significantly gain 
in long-run value in one and two years after mergers by 0.056 and 0.081 and lose in the 
three years window. That is, glamour acquirers outperform value acquirers in raising the 
long-run value through merger mechanism. Long-run values of glamour acquirers are 
significantly higher than those of value acquirers by 0.110, 0.299 and 0.118 over the three 
event windows. Combined with the analysis of firm-specific mispricing correction for 
glamour acquirers, which shows that market-timing motive is the dominant motive for 
glamour stocks, we posit that for glamour acquirers the motive of mergers is growth 
through acquisitions funded with overvalued stocks.
B. Long-run profitability and sales growth
Next, we investigate effects of mergers and acquisitions on operating 
performance. Table 6 reports accounting performance of the combined firm before and 
after the event. We apply the method of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) in computing 
the accounting performance of the “combined” firm before and after merger events. The 
before-merger performance is computed as the market value-weighted average of the
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target and acquirer. The weight of target is the value of the acquisition deal divided by 
deal value plus total market value of the acquiring firm. The post-merger performance of 
the combined firm is the performance of the acquiring firm solely because it is the 
merged firm. We use five measures of accounting performance: return on total assets, 
cash-flow returns on assets, returns on cash-adjusted assets, returns on sales, and sales 
growth. The first four ratios measure profitability, and sales growth measures growth 
opportunities.
<Table 6 is about here.>
In Panel A of Table 6, performance one-year before and after the merger is 
reported. There is evidence of significant improvements in profitability after mergers. 
Regarding the median changes for the whole sample, return on assets is 0.74% higher, 
cash-flow return on assets is 0.96% higher, return on cash adjusted assets is 0.89% 
higher, return on sales is 0.60% higher, but sales growth is 1.62% lower. Similar results 
are found when the acquirers are divided into stock or cash payers. To control for 
industry contemporaneous trends, beside the raw operating performance we also compute 
industry-adjusted performance and report in Panel B. The industry-adjusted performances 
are the differences between values for the merged firms and those of the median non- 
merged firm in the same 2-digit SIC code. Similar and consistent with the results of Panel 
A, merged firms experience improvements in return on assets, cash-flow return on assets, 
return on sales increase, and return on sales of 1.13%, 1.27%, 1.31%, and 0.73% 
respectively. Sales growth, as in Panel A, declines significantly by 1.98%. The industry- 
adjusted performance measures are better than the non-industry-adjusted measures, 
implying that the performances of the non-merged firms in the industry become worse off
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over the same period. This result is similar to those reported by Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001) and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) that the cash flows of the non- 
merged firms in the same industry of the merged companies fall remarkably over the 
same period. Thus, post-merger operating performance improves relative to the industry, 
despite the evidence suggests that part of the improvement could be due to the weaker 
industry performance.
Regarding the effect of payment method on operating performance, we create 
sub-samples of mergers based on the payment method. In Panel A of Table 6, the results 
show that stock payers have less positive improvements in non-industry-adjusted 
accounting performances than cash payers regarding the first four measures in terms of 
the median value, but stock payers have a smaller decline than cash payers in sales 
growth. In fact, the mean values of various performance measures of the stock mergers 
do not show any significant improvement at all. Similar and consistent results are found 
for industry-adjusted performance.
In sum, the operating performance of the combined firms improves after the 
merger. However, a part of the improvement could be due to the weaker industry 
performance, as suggested by Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992). In addition, the weak or lack of performance improvements of stock 
mergers relative to cash mergers suggest that the motive of stock mergers may not be 
synergy related.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
C. Market Reactions and Motives of mergers and acquisitions
To see if the market is aware of the various motives of mergers and acquisitions, 
we examine the market reactions to merger announcements. We sort the whole sample 
into groups based on the type of misvaluation correction over the year (0,1) window. 
Based on the three M/B ratio correction components, this grouping method creates eight 
mutually exclusive groups. The first group includes mergers that have firm-specific 
mispricing corrections only. The second group includes mergers that have industry- 
specific mispricing corrections only. The third group includes mergers that have long- 
run value-to-book corrections only. The fourth group includes mergers that have both 
firm-specific mispricing and industry-specific mispricing corrections. The fifth group 
includes mergers that have firm-specific mispricing and long-run value-to-book 
corrections. The sixth group includes mergers that have both industry-specific mispricing 
and long-run value-to-book corrections. The seventh group includes mergers that have 
all three types of mispricing corrections. Finally, the eighth group includes mergers that 
do not have any of the three corrections. That is, observations included in the eighth 
group are those that do not show corrections for motives of market-timing, industry- 
response, agency cost, and hubris.
The sorting based on the one-year window gives us some interesting results in 
Panel A of Table 7. Of the 3520 mergers examined, 377 (10.7%) experience only a firm- 
specific misevaluation correction; 113 (3.2%) experience only an industry-specific 
mispricing correction; and 278 (7.9%) experience only a long-run value-to-book 
correction. If we include mergers that have more than one type of mispricing corrections, 
2576 (73%) acquirers have motives that are related to firm-specific mispricing; 762
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(21.6%) mergers have motives that are related to responses to industrial shocks; 2090 
mergers (59.2%) have motives that are related to long-run value-to-book mispricing. In 
short, market-timing appears to be the most important motive behind mergers and 
acqusitions. This observation is consistent with RKVR and SV that merger waves occur 
when common shares of acquirers are overvalued. Agency cost or hubris related motives 
are the second most important in driving merger activity. That is, the mispricing by the 
market provides managers of acquirers an opportunity to use shares that are overvalued to 
help promote personal interests. This is consistent with the evidence reported in Panel D 
of Table 5 that stock payers suffer firm-specific mispricing and long-run value-to-book 
corrections that are significantly larger than those of cash payers. In addition, results in 
all the other panels of Table 5 show that firm-specific mispricing corrections are in 
general significantly negative over the three event windows whereas long-run value-to- 
book mispricing corrections are insignificant or significantly negative. In short, the 
market is aware o f the motives behind these mergers and reacts negatively. Mergers with 
motives that are related to market-timing and agency cost/hubris are value-destroying 
events on average. On the other hand, the results also show that response to industrial 
shocks is not a major motive (only 3.2%) for mergers. However, from Panels A through 
G of Table 5, we can easily see that mergers involving this motive elicit positive 
responses from the market regardless of the frequency, method of payment, fraction of 
the target acquired, and M/B ratio of the acquirer. These mergers are value-creating 
events as the market considers such responses to industry shocks as appropriate. Thus, we 
have just unambiguously shown that mergers could either create or destroy firm value. 
We have done so using a single methodology and uses parameters that are comparable.
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To get further support regarding the value-creating or value-destroying impacts of 
mergers, the rest of Panel A of Table 7 reports changes in industry-adjusted operating 
performance over the one-year window by the type of mispricing correction.
Results in Panel A of Table 7 show that mergers with decrease in firm-specific 
mispricing, group 1, improve operating performance after the event, all of the four 
profitability measures improve at the 5% significance level. Mean (median) of return on 
assets, cash flow return on asset, return on cash adjusted assets, and return on sales 
increase by 2.35% (1.94%), 2.38% (1.90%), 2.64% (2.04%), and 2.77% (1.35%) 
respectively. The firms in this group suffer a decline in firm-specific mispricing even 
though their operating performance improves after the merger. This result implies that the 
market strongly believes that mergers are driven by overvaluation of stock, so the market 
corrects for the mispricing despite the merger itself improves the performance of the 
combined firms. Group 2 mergers also experience increases in all the four profitability 
measures though return on assets increase insignificantly. The positive industry-specific 
mispricing correction implies that the market is in favor of the mergers as a response to 
industry shocks that successfully improve operating performance after merger events. For 
firms in Group 3, mergers do not lead to improvements in operating performance. Except 
the median of change in cash flow ROA, all the other measures have insignificant 
changes. That is, mergers that are driven by motives of agency cost and hubris are likely 
to suffer in operating performance as well. For mergers that have market-timing and 
industry response motives, Group 4, the operating performance improvement is less 
consistent given that all the mean values of the changes are all insignificant. Mergers that 
are related to agency or hubris problems, Groups 5, 6, and 7, in general report
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insignificant changes in all the operating performance measures or significant changes in 
only a few of the measures. Some changes are negative. In sum, when a merger is 
associated with motives related to agency problems or hubris, the acquirer suffers a 
decline in operating performance after the event. Improvements in operating performance 
are likely to occur only when mergers are related to market-timing or industry shocks.
D. Cumulative returns and market reactions
In Panels B and C of Table 7 we report results of regressing cumulative abnormal 
returns [CAR(Ol) and CAR(-1,1)] of merger announcements on variables commonly 
used to represent motives of acquisitions. The market model is used to estimate stock 
abnormal returns.
R i,t =  a i + R f , t  +  P ,  ( R m,, ~ R f , t )
Rj t is stock i return at time t. Rft and RmJ are risk-free return and market return, 
respectively, at time t. Cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are estimated as follows.
c a r u M  =£(*«
h
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The regression model is:
CiR [0,l] = a  + p lSTOCK+P2CASH +p}ROAO\ + P4ROA03 + p 5ADJACASH+ P6 ADJCASH* LOWM / B 
+ p 1AVESG+piLOGTA+p9BLEV
where STOCK is the method of payment dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if  the 
payment is in stock and 0 otherwise. CASH is cash payment dummy variable, taking 
value of 1 if  payment is in cash and 0 otherwise. Both STOCK and CASH dummies have 
a value of 0 if  the payment is other methods. These two variables are for diagnosing the 
market timing motive. Negative coefficient on STOCK and positive coefficient on CASH 
provide evidence that market timing is a motive for mergers and acquisitions. We use 
one-year and three-year change of return on assets after merger events, ROAOl and 
ROA03, to diagnose industry-response and synergy motives. Signaling theories posit that 
stock return should positively correlate with future improvement in profitability if  market 
expects an improvement in profitability. Therefore, positive coefficients on ROAOl and 
ROA03 provide evidence for industry-shock response and synergy motives. ADJCASH 
is cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets. LOWM/B is a low-valuation 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if  the acquirer’s M/B ratio is less than 1 and of 0 
otherwise. These two variables are for diagnosing the agency cost/hubris motive. Agency 
cost /hubris hypothesis argues that firms with low growth opportunities (low M/B) are 
more likely to spend their cash on non value-increasing projects. Therefore, negative 
coefficients of ADJCASH and ADJCASH* LOWM/B imply that investors dislike 
mergers that are associated with agency cost/hubris problems. AVESG is the three-year 
average of sales growth of the acquirer before the merger. A positive coefficient on
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AVESG implies that the market supports firms with high growth potential to grow 
through making mergers and acquisitions. LOGTA is logarithmic total assets of acquirers 
in the year before the merger. BLEV is book leverage of acquirers in the year before 
mergers. These two variables enter the regression to control for size and financial 
leverage. Though not reported, in the regressions we also include industry and year 
dummy variables to control for industry and calendar year effects. R-square is reported 
on the last row.
The regression for the whole sample shows evidence for market timing, synergy, 
and industry-shock responding motive. STOCK has significant negative coefficient and 
CASH has significant positive coefficient at 1% level, which strongly supports Hypothesis 
1 that merger is driven by market timing. ROAOl is positive and significant at 1%, 
implying that the market expects the operating performance will improve soon after the 
merger. This supports Hypothesis 3 and 4 that firms merge to respond to industry shocks 
and to improve operating performance from synergy of the combined target and acquirer. 
ADJCASH has a positive coefficient and ADJCASH*LOWM/B has a negative coefficient 
though they are not significant. This evidence suggests that for the whole sample, the 
market does not consider the mergers are driven by self interest on average. AVESG has an 
insignificant positive coefficient, which suggests that market is not very much interested in 
the benefit of achieving growth through merger mechanism.
Comparing the regression results of groups 1, 2 and 3, we see that market timing 
effect is strongest for group 1 with expected signs for STOCK and CASH coefficients. 
Group 1 has STOCK with significant negative coefficient at 1% level and CASH with 
insignificant positive coefficient. This means that market timing is most likely associated
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with firms that experience firm-specific mispricing correction. The coefficients of ROAOl 
and ROA03 of the three groups show that the market expects an improved long-run 
performance for group-1 mergers and a poor long-run operating performance for group-3 
mergers. For group 1, ROA03 is positive at 1% level, which confirms the analysis of 
operating performance for group 1 that market strongly believes that mergers are driven by 
overvaluation of stock, so it corrects for mispricing even though it at the same time expects 
synergy. For group 3, ROA03 is negative at 5% level, which indicates that the market 
expects poor long-run performance for low-growth firms. The coefficients for ADJCASH 
and ADJCASH* LOWM/B, however, are internally contradictory. These two variables have 
unexpected signs and also are insignificant for group 2 and 3. The two variables however 
are significant at 1% level but have opposite signs. The noisy results indicate that there may 
be an unobserved endogeneity in the model; it renders our observation of the agency 
problem as a motive of mergers inconclusive.




In general, we find supports for all of our hypotheses that market timing, industry- 
shock responding, and synergy are the motives of acquisitions. Firstly, we find a 
significant reduction of firm-specific mispricing after merger events, an evidence for the 
market timing motive. Secondly, we find that industry-specific mispricing increases after 
the merger, an evidence that the market supports merger activity as an appropriate 
response to industry shocks. Thirdly, we find that long-nm-value-to-book of acquiring 
firms declines but by a smaller amount than that of non-merged firms. We, therefore, 
attribute this long-run-value destruction to broad market corrections across all firms and 
not to agency/hubris problem. Accounting performance analysis shows that mergers and 
acquisitions lead to improved operating performance, which may be interpreted as an 
evidence that synergy is involved. Among the three motives, market timing is the most 
dominant. Market timing motive is so strong that it dilutes away the synergy effect of 
mergers and acquisitions. We conclude that merger and acquisition decisions are possibly 
value-creating but at the same time are overwhelmingly driven by market overvaluation. 
These simultaneous effects of various motives explain for documented evidence that 
mergers seems to be value-destroying decision. More specifically, we found that large 
acquiring firms and large share acquisition transactions are more related to the agency 
cost and hubris problems, and that glamour acquiring firms pursue growth through 
mergers and acquisitions by issuing their overvalued stocks. The robust check on short- 
run stock returns confirms the three motives o f acquisitions, including market timing, 
industry-shock response, and synergy.
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Table 1. Sample of mergers by year
Merger events come from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) merger database and are required to have acquirer information on the Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and Compustat data tapes. Only completed deals with value greater than $10 million are 
included. All-stock and all-cash acquisitions refer to transactions that are paid wholly in stock or cash, respectively. Other-method 
acquisitions include combinations of stock, cash, other methods and unknown methods. “Freq” is number of events. “Row %” and 
“Column %” are the proportions of acquisitions by payment methods and by year, respectively. Mean and median of deal value for all 
acquisitions are in millions of US dollars as reported by SDC.
All-stock acquisitions All-cash acquisitions Other-method acquisitions All acquisitions
Deal Value
Year Freq Row % Freq Row % Freq Row % Freq Column% Mean Median
1984 5 17.86 15 53.57 8 28.57 28 0.80 397.5 108.7
1985 7 1 2 . 0 0 38 64.00 14 24.00 59 1.67 410.8 1 2 2 .1
1986 5 6.90 52 75.86 1 2 17.24 6 8 1.94 323.7 113.2
1987 13 12.94 54 54.12 33 32.94 1 0 0 2.84 346.2 133.1
1988 1 1 12.16 53 60.81 24 27.03 87 2.47 392.5 97.2
1989 18 14.85 56 47.52 45 37.62 119 3.38 421.5 59.5
1990 13 17.81 40 46.58 31 35.62 8 8 2.44 1 1 0 .1 37.3
1991 16 26.42 2 1 33.96 23 39.62 62 1.77 187.7 72.3
1992 18 24.59 25 36.07 28 39.34 72 2.04 164.0 59.7
1993 2 1 21.18 30 38.82 44 40.00 1 0 0 2.84 262.3 75.4
1994 2 1 29.85 33 47.76 18 22.39 79 2.24 194.9 47.2
1995 54 28.75 79 41.88 45 29.38 188 5.35 516.3 86.3
1996 62 25.85 99 40.98 80 33.17 240 6.85 521.4 78.5
1997 93 32.64 91 31.82 1 0 1 35.54 285 8.09 471.1 131.2
1998 128 37.33 115 33.56 1 0 0 29.11 344 9.76 833.0 1 1 1 .1
1999 131 33.33 145 36.94 117 29.73 392 11.13 1280.5 149.2
2 0 0 0 117 32.67 142 39.93 98 27.39 357 10.13 1450.1 172.9
2 0 0 1 85 32.73 85 32.73 89 34.55 259 7.36 897.1 110.4
2 0 0 2 40 18.68 94 43.96 80 37.36 204 6.08 766.5 86.4
2003 51 20.77 93 38.16 1 0 0 41.06 224 6.92 646.7 1 1 1 . 0
2004 31 2 0 . 0 0 62 37.86 6 8 42.14 165 4.68 1311.7 167.2





















































Table 2. Characteristics of non-merged and acquiring firms
Statistics for non-merged and acquiring firms are taken from both Compustat and CRSP for the 
period betw een 1985 and 2004 to match the availability o f  event data from SDC. Statistics are in  
m illions o f  U S dollars. Observations are required to have RO A  and ROE greater than - 200%  and 
-2000% , respectively, M /B  ratio below  100 and market equity larger than $10 m illion. Statistics 
are mean values.




Market value o f  firm 3272.46 10,246.38
Book value o f  firm 2895.73 7,842.70
Market value o f equity 2,126.74 6,023.15
Book value o f equity 1360.72 3,028.22
Plant, Property & Equipment 527.42 1,246.96
Capital expenditures 82.24 211.38
Long-term debt 432.24 946.12
Net income 48.23 147.62
Return on assets ratio 1.70% 10.60%
Return on equity ratio 3.20% 17.67%
M/B ratio 3.27 4.01
Market Leverage 35.12% 36.90%
Book Leverage 53.28% 59.03%
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Table 3. Statistics of market-to-book ratio
Firms are grouped into all acquirers, one-time acquirers and active acquirers groups. Statistics of 
M/B ratios and log(M) -  log(B) are reported for each group for before event, one year, two years 
and three years after event. First-row and second-row statistics are means and medians, 
respectively. Significance levels are reported for mean and median. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.
Panel A. M/B ratio in base form
A ll acquirers One-time acquirers Active acquirers
Number of events 3520 992 2528
Before event 4 01*** 3.20 *** 4.26 ***
2.38 *** 1.92 *** 2.52 ♦**
One year after event 3.71*** 2.79 *** 3.98 ***
2.27  *** 1.79** 2.40 ***
Two years after event 3.52*** 2.32 *** 3.84 ***
2.31 *** 1.74 ** 2.48 ***
Three years after event 3.59*** 2.83 *** 3.77 ***
2.37 *** 1.85 ** 2.60 ***
P anel B . M /B  ratio in  logarith m ic form , log(M ) -  log(B )
A ll acquirers One-time acquirers Active acquirers
Number o f events 3520 992 2528
Before event 1.379*** 1.172** 1.425**
0.869 *** 0.651 * 0.923 ***
One year after event 1.347*** 1.095** 1.405**
0.823 *** 0.580 ** 0.876 ***
Two years after event 1.250*** 1.004** 1.301**
0.840 *** 0.555 ** 0.908 **
Three years after event 1.206*** 0.935** 1.225**
0.867 *** 0.617* 0.954 **
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Table 4. Estimation model of market equity - Parameter estimates
mit =a ojt +a ij,bi, +a 2jtnii, +a 3j<I « 0)(ni)lt +«4 jtLevit +et
mu is the logarithm of market value of stock i at time t. bu is the book value of equity of firm i at 
time t. niit is the logarithm of net income of firm i at time 1.1(<0) is a dummy variable, taking value 
of one for negative-net-income firms and of zero for other firms. Levit is the market leverage ratio 
of firm i at time t. st is regression residual. Regression coefficient parameters are reported for 
each industry group horizontally. Industries are grouped into 12 groups using Fama and French 
12-industry classification. R-squares for time-series regressions for each group are reported in the 
last column. ***, ** and * denote significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.
Group & 0J< « i  j, a 2jt «3  j, «4,Y R-square
1 1.80 *** 0.71 *** 0.35 *** -0 . 1 2 -1.95 *** 0.87
2 1.84*** 0.81 *** 0.25 *** -0 . 0 2 -2.28 *** 0 . 8 8
3 1.75 *** 0.77 *** 0.26 *** -0.03 -2 . 1 1  *** 0.87
4 2 . 0 0  *** 0.76 *** 0.25 *** -0.03 -2.35 *** 0.84
5 2.49 *** 0 . 6 6  *** 0.32 *** -0.05 -2.51 *** 0 . 8 6
6 1.95 *** 0.74 *** 0.28 *** -0.14 *** -2 . 2 2  *** 0.81
7 2.61 *** 0.77 *** 0.19 0.04 -3.26 *** 0.81
8 2.95 *** 0 . 8 6  *** 0 . 1 1 0.06 -4.03 *** 0 . 8 6
9 2.04 *** 0.77 *** 0.25 *** -0 . 1 0  * -2.48 *** 0.83
1 0 2.39 *** 0.65 *** 0.35 *** -0.13 ** -2.45 *** 0.79
1 1 2 .15*** 0.60 *** 0.43 *** -0.18 *** -1.75 *** 0.80
1 2 j 9 9  *** 0.73 *** 0.29 *** -0 . 1 1  ** -2.18 *** 0.82
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Table 5. Decomposition of M/B ratio
Equity M/B ratio in logarithmic form is decomposed into firm-specific mispricing, industry-specific mispricing and long-run value to
book value components. m“ is firm-specific mispricing. is industry-specific mispricing and long-
run value to book value of equity. The changes of each component over one-year, two-year and three-year windows are reported. First-row 
and second-row statistics are mean and median, respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
“Difference” rows reports mean of two-sample differences.
Panel A. Market correction after events of all acquirers




mu -v {d u-,ajt)


























Panel B. Market correction after events -  Non-merged firms vs. Acquiring firms
Event windows [year] 
Acquiring firms (A)
Non-merged firms (NM)
Difference (A - NM)
Firm-specific mispricing correction
mu -  v($i(; aj,)
[0,11 [0,21 [0,31
Industry-specific mispricing correction 
[0,11 [0,21 [0,31
Long-run value correction
v(Pu- ,c ij) -b u
[0,11 [0,31
N 1726 1674 1557 1727 1680 1569 1811 1760 1647
-.058 *** -.160 *** .  172 *** .012 .050 *** .080 *** .009 -.019 * .0 8 1  ***
-.039 *** - 089 *** - 090 *** .016 ** 041 * * * .045 *** .017** .005 -.040 ***
N 31904 22277 23477 32418 28063 23897 33085 28445 24612
-.020** - 019*** -.038*** .016*** .041*** .061*** -.019*** -.047*** -.069***
-.022 *** -.012 *** -.027 ** .001 *** .036 *** .051 *** -.003 ** -.028 ** -.045 ***





















































Panel C. Market correction after events of acquirers by frequency of mergers and acquisitions
Event windows [year]
Firm-specific mispricing correction 
10,11 [0,21 [0,31
Industry-specific mispricing correction




[0 ,lj  [0,2] [0,3]
One-time acquirers -.111 *** -.166 *** -.224 *** .026 .046 *** .086 *** .008 -.068*** -.140 ***
N=992 events -.103 *** -.067 *** -173 *** .029 * .0 1 1 .043 *** -.002 -.045*** -.118 ***
Active acquirers -.040 * -.158 *** -.155 *** .006 .051 *** .078 *** .009 -.003 -.062 ***
N=2528 events -.018 -.105 *** -.076 *** .014 .050 *** 0 4 5  *** .0 2 2  * * .0 2 1  * * -.025 ***
Difference (Once -  Active) -.071 -.008 -.069 .020 -.005 .008 -.001 -.065 ** -.077 **
P an el D . M ark et correction  after  events o f  acqu irers b y  m ethod o f  paym en t
Event windows [year]
Firm-specific mispricing correction
m„ -  v{6it; a jt)
[0,11 [0,21 10,31
Industry-specific mispricing correction 
[0,1] [0,2] [0,3]
Long-run value correction 
[0,11 [0,21 [0,31
Stock payers -.070*** -.378 *** - 473 *** .046* .165 *** . 2 2 2  *** -.026 _  084 *** -.153 ***
N=940 events -.066 -.180 *** -.279 *** .053 *** .109 *** .141 *** -.006 -.040 *** -.069 ***
Cash payers .  039 *** -.097 *** -.046 . 0 0 1 . 0 1 0 .038 *** .0 2 1 -.007 -.076 ***
N=1422 events .003 *** -.084 *** -.015 .015 * .020 * .016 ** .033 *** .026* -.042 ***
Other method payers -.048 -.038 -.077 * .028 .014 .056 *** -.006 .014 - . 0 1 2
N =1158 events -.004 - 041 *** -.059 *** .006 .028 ** .037* .000 .007 -.016 **
Difference (Stock -  Cash) -.031 *** -.281 *** .  426 *** .045 * .1544*** .184 *** -.047 * -.077 ** -.077 **
Difference (Cash -  Other) - . 0 2 2 -.058 .031 -.027 -.004 -.017 .027 - . 0 2 1 -.064 *




























































[0, 1] [0,21 [0,31
Acquired shares less than -.079 -.060 * -.063 * .024 .004 .058 *** .014 .018 - . 0 0 2
10% (Group 1) 
N=869
-.066 *** -.046 * -.023 .015 .017 .018 * .032 *** .033 ** .007
Acquired shares greater -.063 -.076 -.050 .040 .091 *** .093 *** -.015 -.030 -.078 ***
than 1 0 % and less than 
100% (Group 2)
N=675
-.013 -.019 -.078 .026 .084 *** .066 *** -.028 -.030 ** -.069 ***




-.031 * -.129 *** -.137*** .014 044 *** .050 *** .018 ** -.011 -.082 ***
(Group 2 - Group 1) 
Difference
.017 -.016 .013 .016 .087 ** .035 -.029 -.048 -.076 *
(Group 3 - Group 1) 
Difference
.033 -.180 *** -.209 *** -.028 * .055 .029 . 0 0 2 -.053 ** -.123 ***





















































Panel F. Market correction after events of acquirers by M/B ratio of acquirers
Firm-specific mispricing correction Industry-specific mispricing correction Long-run value correction
mu -  v(0it; Oj, )  v(0u ; a „) -  v(0u; a j )  v (0 „ ; a , ) -  bu
Event windows [year] 1 0 ,1 1 [0 , 2 ] [0,3] [0 , 1 1 [0 , 2 ] [0,31 [0 , 1 1 [0 , 2 ] [0,31
M /B ratio of Acquirers 
Quintile 1 .060 *** -.048 - . 0 0 2 .023 . 1 2 1  *** .135 *** -.053 ** .  218 *** -.167***
.072 *** .010 .007 .006 .082 *** .100 *** -.037 ** -.196 *** -.149***
Quintile 2 -.135 *** .007 -.053 . 0 0 0 .055 * .096 *** -.009 -.117*** -.138***
-.057  *** .019 .006 .014 .014 .052 ** -.022 ** -.103 *** -.122***
Quintile 3 -.024 -.070 -.025 . 0 1 1 -.017 -.025 -.014 -.008 -.068 **
-.040 -.049 -.023 .007 .016 -.032 * -.011 .005
Quintile 4 - . 0 2 0  ** -.169 *** .  214 *** -.027 -.008 .025 .036 .082 *** - . 0 2 1
-.028 -1 4 4  *** -.103 *** .016 .038 * .017 .033 *** .049 *** .001
Quintile 5 -.314 *** - 414 *** .  440 *** .049 ** .106 *** .163 *** .056 *** .081 *** -.048 **
-.246 *** -.172 *** -.272 *** .050 *** .072 *** .102 *** 0 4 7  *** .059 *** -.011





















































Panel G. Market correction after events of acquirers by market value of equity of acquirers
Firm-specific mispricing correction Industry-specific mispricing correction Long-run value correction
mu -v(0„-,all) v (0 „ ;a , . ,) -v (3 ,;a ,)  v(6>,;ay) - 6 l(
Event windows [year] [0 , 1 ] [0 , 2 ] [0,3] [0 , 1 ] [0 , 2 ] [0,3] [0 , 1 1 [0 , 2 1 [0,31
M arket value o f Acquirers 
Quintile 1 -.068 ** -.019 .016 .006 .064 ** .047 .024 -.065 *** -.064 *
-  017 *** .037 .060 .008 .061 *** .026 .002 -.073 ** -.055 *
Quintile 2 -.071 * -.090 * -.178 *** .005 .018 0 7 9  *** - . 0 1 2 -.058 * -.095***
-  087 *** -.061 * -.094 *** .025 * .020 .035 ** -.006 -.033 ** -.072***
Quintile 3 .042 -.089 ** -.128 ** -.030 .026 .063 ** - . 0 2 2 - . 0 2 2 - 109***
.011 -.047* -.047* .005 .019 .043 ** -.003 .002 -.103***
Quintile 4 -.103 ** -.262 *** .  234 *** .056 ** .107 *** .093 *** . 0 1 1 -.027 -.068***
-.037 * -.144 *** -.115 *** .024 ** .038 *** .032 ** .031 .021 -.029***
Quintile 5 -.094 ** . 284 *** . 280 *** .016 .032 .108 *** .042 ** .055 *** -.070***
-.101 -.130 *** -.129 *** .016 .070 *** .070 *** .034 *** .051 *** -.019 *





















































Panel H. Market corrections after events of acquirers by industry
Firms are grouped into twelve industry groups based on 12-industry classification suggested by Fama and French.
Firm-specific mispricing correction Industry-specific mispricing correction Long-run value correction
mu v(0 „;« ,,)-v (0 „;ay) v(&it’aJ) -b il
Event windows 
[year] [0,1] [0, 2] [0,3] [0,1] [0,2] [0,3] [0,1] [0,2] [0,3]
Group N
Consumer Nondurables
1 224 -.025 -.085 -.053 .042 * .053 * .018 -.004 .0 1 1 -.033
-.017 -.050 -.013 .028 ** .030 * .019 .009 .026 -.019
Consumer Durables
2 72 -.061 .092 -.098 -.057 -.061 .033 .049 -.023 -.065
-.094 -.014 -.272 -.054 -.051 .032 .050 -.044 -.055
Manufacturing
3 344 -.041 -.062 -.047 -.014 .005 .040 * .025 - . 0 1 2 -.077 ***
-.084 ** -.112 ** -.015 ** -.008 .015 .051 * .033 ** .011 -.032 *
Energy
4 116 .231 *** - . 0 2 2 . 0 0 0 -.095 -  182 *** - . 0 1 0 -.164 *** -.077 . 209 ***
.044 -.160 -.035 -.050 -.155 *** .112 -.064 -.017 -.237 ***
Chemicals
5 107 -.023 -.072 - . 0 1 1 .044 .150 *** .152 *** -.018 -.059 -.135*
-.066 .033 -.036 .025 .063 *** .099 .025 .034 -.108 *
Business equipment
6  584 -.157*** 4 4 4  *** -.356 *** .044 * 174 *** .2 0 1  *** -.008 -.090 *** _  165 ***





















































Panel H. Market corrections after events of acquirers by industry (continued)
Firm-specific mispricing correction Industry-specific mispricing correction Long-run value correction
mH -v (9 u\a jt) v(9u-,aJt)- v(0 „
Group N [0 , 1 ] [0 , 2 ] [0,3] [0 , 1 ] [0 , 2 ] [0,3] [0 , 1 ] [0 , 2 ] [0,3]
Telephone and Television transmission
7 109 .041 - . 2 2 0  * -.503 *** -.014 .063 -.008 .057 .064 -.163
-.006 -.281 -.453 *** .023 .072 .050 .065 .117 -.070
Utilities
8 158 -.090 . 0 2 0 -.150* .067 -.004 .037 .007 .052 .017
-.060 * -.011 -.062 * .063 .042 .059 -.011 .035 -.052
W holesale, Retails, Some Services
9 263 -.052 -.130** -.129* .003 .018 .055 * .052 * - .0 0 1 - 127 ***
-.068 ** -.061 ** -.076 .008 .021 -.013 .028 ** .006 -.077 ***
Healthcare
10 232 -.066 .009 -.123 * .013 -.038 .039 .038 .036 .055
-.019 -.078 -0 1 7  *** -.043 .042 .029 * .017 .039 .033
Finance
11 1023 _ 0 9 7  *** -.161 *** - 2 3 2  *** .015 .051 * .079 ** .025 -.018 -.035
-.017 -.064 *** -.128 .025 .037 .002 ** -.003 -.041 -.012
Other (Mines, Construction, Building Materials, Transportation, Hotels, Business Services, Entertainment)
1 2  288 .053 -.061 -.104 -.032 .014 .036 .003 .024 -.055























































Table 6. Change of operating performance one year after the merger
Performance of the 2combined firms before event is the asset-market-value weighted average of 
performance of two firms, target and acquirer involving in the transaction. The nominator of 
weight of targets is deal value. The nominator of weight of acquirers is the market value of assets 
of acquiring firms. Performance of the combined firms after event is the performance of the 
acquirer itself.
Panel A. Unadjusted one-year change in operating performance
Raw operating performance and one-year change of operating performance measures are reported 
for stock, cash and other payment methods. First-row and second-row statistics are means and 
medians, respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, 
respectively.








Return on assets (%) -  Before 16.13*** 12.80*** 16.65*** 17.42***
events 15.19 *** 13.72*** 16.09*** 14.13***
Return on assets (%) -  After events 16.26*** 12.49*** 17.66*** 16.48***
16.00 *** 14.81*** 16.90*** 15.26***
Change of Return on assets 0.13 -0.31 1 .0 1 *** -0.94
(After -  Before) 0.74 *** 0.58*** 1.18*** 0.96***
Cash-flow return on assets (%) - 9  4 3 *** 5.49*** 10.06*** 10.97***
Before events 8.85 *** 7.08*** 9.91*** 8.17***
Cash-flow return on assets (%) - 10.16*** 6.23*** 1 1 .6 6 *** 10.38***
After events 9.89 *** 7 p3*** 10.96*** 9.26***
Change o f Cash flow ROA 0.73 0.74 1.60*** -0.58
(After -  Before) 0.96 *** 0.87*** 1.38*** 0.97***
Return on cash-adjusted assets (%) - 19.57*** 13.87*** 2 0 .0 2 *** 22.43***
Before events 16.64 *** 15.68*** 17.81*** 15.44***
Return on cash-adjusted assets (%) - 19.23*** 13.24*** 21.17*** 2 0 .0 1 ***
After events 17.63 *** 16.67*** 18.40*** 16.84***
Change of Return on cash -0.34 -0.63 1.15*** -2.43
adjusted assets (After -  Before) 0.89 *** 0.69*** 1.27*** 1.04***
Return on sales (%) -  Before events 14.24*** 1.77 16.29*** 18.89***
15.95 *** 16.03*** 15.60*** 16.03***
Return on sales (%) — After events 16.64*** 7.99 18.78*** 18.75***
16.72 *** 17.58*** 16.41*** 17.16***
Change of Return on sales 2.39** 6 . 2 2 2.50*** -0.14
(After -  Before) 0.60 *** q 5 3 *** 0.87*** 0.60***
Sales growth (%) -  Before events 20.15*** 27.51*** 17.57*** 19.55***
12.47 *** 17.63*** 9  9 7 *** 11.95***
Sales growth (%) -  After events 18.68*** 28.34*** 15.39*** 17.76***
11.01 *** 16.34*** 9.12*** 10.72***
Change of Sales growth -1.47 0.83 -2.18* -1.79
(After -  Before) -1.62 *** -2.45 -1.50*** -1.17
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Panel B. Industry-adjusted one-year change in operating performance
Industry-adjusted operating performance is the difference between the combined firm’s 
performance measures and the corresponding statistics for the median non-merged firms 
in the same 2-digit SIC industry, computed for each year separately. First-row and second- 
row statistics are mean and median, respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the .01, .05 












Return on assets (%) -  Before 9.66*** 7.39*** 9.77*** 10.92***
events 6.95*** 6.79*** 7.50*** 6.08***
Return on assets (%) -  After events 10.06*** 7.84*** 10.96*** 10.09***
7.72*** 7.75*** 8.10*** 6.71***
Change of Return on assets 0.40 0.45 j 19*** -0.83
(After -  Before) 1.13*** 1.04*** 2.12*** 0.98***
Cash-flow return on assets (%) - 8.71*** 5.82*** 8.84*** 10.32***
Before events 6.27*** 5.33*** 6.84*** 5.67***
Cash-flow return on assets (%) - 9.47*** 6  99*** 10.46*** 9.55***
After events 7.75*** 8.01*** 8.05*** 6.61***
Change of Cash flow ROA 0.77 1.17 1.62*** -0.78
(After -  Before) 1.27*** 1.21 *** 2.52*** 0.91***
Return on cash-adjusted assets (%) - 13.61*** 8.73*** 13.64*** 16.61***
Before events 7.85*** 7.73*** 8.31*** 6.95***
Return on cash-adjusted assets (%) - 13.65*** 9.06*** 15.03*** 14.40***
After events 8.87*** 8.95*** 9  3 7 *** 7.50***
Change of Return on cash 0.04 0.32 1.39*** -2 . 2 1
adjusted assets (After — Before) 1.31*** 1.04*** 2.19*** 1.2 1 ***
Return on sales (%) -  Before events 8.80*** 8 . 0 0 10.97*** 8.75***
8.45*** 9.58*** 7.77*** 8.60***
Return on sales (%) -  After events 11.43*** 9.86 13.62*** 8.70***
9.33*** 11.57*** 8.67*** 9.32***
Change of Return on sales 2.62** 1 . 8 6 2.65*** -0.05
(After -  Before) 0.73*** 0.61*** 1.73*** 0.41**
Sales growth (%) -  Before events 8.80*** 9.01*** 6.69*** 8.78***
1.35*** 4 78*** 0.15 1.36***
Sales growth (%) -  After events 7.07*** 9.96*** 4.08*** 6.75***
0.55*** 3.95*** -0.95 0.61***
Change of Sales growth -1.73** 0.95 -2.61*** -2.03
(After -  Before) -1.98*** -2.33* -2.35*** -0.89
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Table 7. Market responses to mergers with various motives.
Mergers are grouped into eight mutually exclusive groups based on the market correction of the three components of equity 
M/B ratio over one-year period, firm-specific mispricing, industry-specific mispricing and long-run value to book value.
Panel A. Industry-adjusted one-year change of operating performance by groups of market valuation corrections
“Change” rows report mean and median of the industry-adjusted one-year change of operating performance before and after 
merger events. First-row and second-row statistics are mean and median, respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the .01, 























































any of the 
three 
correction
Group number (1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 )
Number of events 3520 377 113 278 387 1550 308 262 245
Change of Return on 0.40 2.35*** 1 .6 8 0.38 0.53 -0 . 0 2 0.92** -0.84* -2.31
assets 1.13*** y 2.58*** 0.87 1.39*** 0.61 0.45** -0.12 -1.82***
Change of Cash flow 0.77 2.38*** 1 .8 6 0.78 0.97 1.04 1.30** -0.36 -2.21
ROA 1.27*** I go*** 2.85*** 0.94** 1.26*** 0.92* 0.71** 0.17 -2.46***
Change of Return on 0.04 2.64*** 4 jg*** 0.94 0 . 2 2 2.51 0.39 -2.22*** -7.47
cash adjusted assets 1.31*** 2.04*** 3.07*** 0.33 1.81*** 0.90* -0.15 -0.55 -2.90***
Change of Return on 2.62** 2.77*** 2.46*** 10.78 2.64 -1.72 1.36 -1.34 3.14***
sales 0.73*** 1.35*** 1.67*** -0.07 1.32*** 0.43* -0.21 -0.13 1.78***
-1.73** 2.05 -0.77 - 1 . 8 8 -0.18 -4.94* -5.00** -1.64 -3.16
Change of Sales growth





















































Panel B. Regression of Cumulative abnormal return over 1-day event window [0,1] by groups of market valuation corrections
CLR[0,1] = a  + faSTOCK + faCASH+faROAO 1 + faROAOl + faADJCASH + fa.ADJCASH* LOWM/B + fa AVESG + faLOGTA + fa0BLEV
Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers over [0,1] window are regressed on various variables. STOCK is stock payment dummy variable, 
taking value of 1 if payment is in stock and 0 otherwise. CASH is cash payment dummy variable, taking value of 1 if payment is in cash and 0 
otherwise. ROAOl and ROA03 are post-event one-year and three-year change of return on assets, respectively. ADJCASH is size-adjusted cash 
and short-term investments in the year before event. LOWM/B is a low-valuation stock dummy variable taking value of 1 if acquirers have 
M/B ratio less than 1, and of 0 otherwise. AVESG is pre-event three-year average of sales growth of acquirers. LOGTA is logarithmic total 
assets of acquirers in the year before event. BLEV is book leverage of acquirers in the year before event. Though not reported here, the 
regressions also include industry and year dummy variables to control for fixed effects, industry and year. ***, ** and * denote significance 























































any of the 
three 
correction
Group number ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 )
Number of events 3520 377 113 278 387 1550 308 262 245
Intercept 0.024** 0.079*** -0.115 0.070 0.007 0.033 0.065* -0.043 0 .1 0 1 *
STOCK -0.019*** -0.032* -0.031 -0.030 -0 . 0 1 0 -0 .0 2 1 *** -0 . 0 2 1 -0.003 -0.016
CASH 0.024*** 0.027** 0 . 0 1 2 -0.003 0.040*** 0.019** 0.030* 0.026 0 .0 2 1
ROAOl 0.131*** -0.229* -0.197 0.071 0.050 0.299*** 0.124 -0 . 2 1 0 0.398**
ROA03 0.017 0.332*** 0.257 -0.152* -0 .1 1 0 ** 0.005 -0.066 0.038 -0.015
ADJCASH -0.008 -0.243*** -0.007 -0.014 -0.082** 0.030 0.064 -0.025 -0.015
ADJCASH’" LowM/B -0.036 0.194** 0.148 -0.005 -0.031 -0.068 0.284 -0.115 0.819
AVESG 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 0.034 0.019 0 . 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 1 -0.013 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 0
LOGTA -0.004*** -0.009* 0 . 0 1 0 -0.013** -0 . 0 0 1 -0.004** -0.008* 0 . 0 0 0 -0 .0 1 0 **
BLEV 0.006 0 . 0 0 2 0.065 0.005 -0.018 -0.009 -0 . 0 0 2 0.070 -0 . 0 0 1





















































Panel C. Regression of Cumulative abnormal return over 2-day event window [-1,1]
G4£[-l,l] = a + p x STOCK+ p 2 CASH+p2 £0401 + p,ROA03 + Ps ADJACASH+ p 6 ADJCASH* LOWM / B + p n A VESG+P9 LOGTA+p wBLEV
Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers over [-1,1] window are regressed on various variables. STOCK is stock payment dummy variable, 
taking value of 1 if payment is in stock and 0 otherwise. CASH is cash payment dummy variable, taking value of 1 if payment is in cash and 0 
otherwise. ROAOl and ROA03 are post-event one-year and three-year change of return on assets, respectively. ADJCASH is size-adjusted cash 
and short-term investments in the year before event. LOWM/B is a low-valuation stock dummy variable taking value of 1 if acquirers have 
M/B ratio less than 1, and of 0 otherwise. AVESG is pre-event three-year average of sales growth of acquirers. LOGTA is logarithmic total 
assets of acquirers in the year before event. BLEV is book leverage of acquirers in the year before event. Though not reported here, the 
regressions also include industry and year dummy variables to control for fixed effects, industry and year. ***, ** and * denote significance at 























































any of the 
three 
correction
Group number (1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 )
Number of events 3520 377 113 278 387 1550 308 262 245
Intercept 0.024** 0.071** -0.078 0.077** 0.003 0.034** 0.047 -0.036 0 .1 0 0 **
STOCK -0.018*** -0 . 0 2 0 -0.055 -0.028 -0.005 -0.025*** -0 . 0 1 2 -0.014 -0 . 0 2 2
CASH 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.025** -0.008 -0 . 0 0 1 0.037*** 0 .0 1 2 * 0.027** 0 . 0 2 0 0.025*
ROAOl 0.141*** -0.118 -0.255 0.116 0.134 0.285*** 0.043 -0 . 1 1 2 0.433***
ROA03 -0.005 0.273*** 0.087 -0.105 -0.151*** -0.037 -0.025 0.035 0.039
ADJCASH -0.013 -0 .2 2 0 *** -0.018 -0.014 -0.094*** 0.009 0.039 -0.005 0.017
ADJCASH *LowM/B -0.005 0.172* 0.159 0 . 0 0 0 -0.032 -0 . 0 0 1 0.258 -0.073 0.829
AVESG 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 -0.008 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.007 0.014 0 . 0 0 1
LOGTA -0.003*** -0 .0 1 0 *** 0 . 0 1 0 -0.014*** 0 . 0 0 2 -0.003* -0.003 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.007**
BLEV -0 . 0 0 2 0.015 0.034 0.008 •-0.043 -0.019 -0.043 0.086* -0.034





















































APPENDIX A -  Decomposition of M/B ratio - Non-merged firms vs. Acquiring firms by year 





















(N M -A )
1988 N 594 13 572 13 563 15
Mean -3.10E-04 .0935 -.094 .0176 -.278 .2959* .0021 -.215 .2174
1989 N 661 79 637 77 615 74
Mean -.004 -.158 .154* -.064 -.186 .1218 -.07 .0138 -.084
1990 N 723 58 692 57 674 59
Mean -.058 -.145 .0868 -.058 -.175 .1165 -.064 -.211 .1471
1991 N 778 46 749 45 725 45
Mean -.043 .0277 -.071 -.037 .0154 -.052 -.037 .1019 -.139
1992 N 822 60 789 60 764 56
Mean -.008 -.013 .0052 -.022 -.05 .0285 -.046 -.025 -.02
1993 N 930 63 894 58 864 55
Mean -.022 .0092 -.032 -.074 .025 -.099 -5.20E-04 -.081 .0806
1994 N 1033 54 978 52 929 50
Mean -.086 .0828 -.169** -.064 .1404 -.204** -.105 .1994 -.305**
1995 N 1203 148 1136 143 1104 139
Mean .0213 .0601 -.039 -.024 .0371 -.061 .0174 .0145 .0029
1996 N 1384 155 1305 151 1216 153
Mean -.074 .0177 -.092 -.037 .0001 -.037 .0339 .0133 .0205
1997 N 1578 169 1428 165 1327 163
Mean .0038 -.059 .0633 .0497 -.04 .0899 .0808 -.071 .1518*
1998 N 1740 224 1604 222 1473 214
Mean .0185 .0063 .0122 .0861 -.137 .2236** -.201 -.172 -.029
1999 N 1853 204 1665 194 1531 187
Mean .0841 -.188 .2716** -.217 -.591 .3746 -.208 -.464 .2556**
2000 N 1883 147 1694 144 1562 143
Mean -.338 .0299 -.368** -.328 -.285 -.043 -.362 -.426 .0637
2001 N 1964 106 1772 102 1672 103
Mean -.073 -.34 .2669** -.155 -.534 .3791** .1463 -.116 .2627*
2002 N 2037 108 1884 103 1608 98











































































(N M -A )
1988 N 598 13 583 13 572 15
Mean .033 .0805 -.047** -.08 .0195 -.099* .1748 .1823 -.008
1989 N 667 79 642 77 625 74
Mean -.111 -.045 -.066* .1554 .1164 .039 .2912 .1634 .1278**
1990 N 728 58 705 57 681 59
Mean .2626 .1488 .1138* .3888 .286 .1028 .4053 .4009 .0045
1991 N 793 46 757 45 729 45
Mean .1386 .1133 .0253 .1493 .2697 -.12 .0295 .1622 -.133
1992 N 829 60 794 60 768 56
Mean .0147 .0584 -.044 -.094 .0245 -.119** -.069 .0205 -.089*
1993 N 934 63 897 58 870 56
Mean -.112 .0234 -.135** -.063 -.035 -.028 -.015 -5.30E-04 -.014
1994 N 1038 54 985 52 938 50
Mean .0601 -.027 .0873 .1222 -.009 .1308* .154 -.062 .2159**
1995 N 1211 148 1145 143 1114 139
Mean .0798 -.054 .1339** .1161 .0094 .1067* -.085 .0198 -.105**
1996 N 1397 155 1318 151 1234 153
Mean .043 .0945 -.051 -.156 .1043 -.26** -.188 -.006 -.183**
1997 N 1589 169 1454 165 1359 164
Mean -.192 .0324 -.225** -.215 -.12 -.096** -.059 -.094 .0354
1998 N 1766 225 1643 222 1516 217
Mean -.013 -.108 .0948** .1543 -.103 .2571** -.013 .013 -.026
1999 N 1897 204 1710 195 1567 187
Mean .172 .0518 .1202** -.004 .257 -.261** .1207 .3018 00 * #
2000 N 1934 147 1735 144 1603 143
Mean -.166 .1337 -.3** -.037 .1779 -.215** -.009 .2577 -.266**
2001 N 2010 106 1822 105 1724 104
Mean .1349 -.094 .2291** .154 .0776 .0764 .3547 .0518 .3029**
2002 N 2079 108 1941 103 1642 102





















































Panel A.3. Long-run value to book value correction
[0,1 year]
Year Non-merged Acquiring Difference
firm  (NM) firm (A) (N M -A )
1988 N 598 76
Mean -.047 -.018 -.028
1989 N 667 79
Mean -.046 .0983 -.144**
1990 N 728 58
Mean -.099 .014 -.113**
1991 N 793 46
Mean -.017 -.115 .0974*
1992 N 829 60
Mean .0367 -.046 .0827*
1993 N 934 63
Mean .04 -.038 .0784
1994 N 1038 54
Mean -.005 .0115 -.016
1995 N 1211 148
Mean -.058 .0789 -.137**
1996 N 1397 155
Mean -.006 .0384 -.044
1997 N 1589 169
Mean .0272 .0229 .0043
1998 N 1766 225
Mean -.083 .0204 -.103**
1999 N 1897 204
Mean -.102 -.006 -.096**
2000 N 1934 147
Mean .004 -.117 .1209**
2001 N 2010 106
Mean -.142 .0802 -.222**
2002 N 2079 108
Mean -.011 -.03 .0182
69
|0 ,2 years]
Non-merged Acquiring Difference 
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APPENDIX B -  Operating performance before and after mergers - Non-merged 
firms vs. Combined firms by years
Combined firms’ and non-merged firms’ operating performances are compared. Non-merged 
firms’ mean of performance measures is the average of all non-merged firms in each calendar 
year. “Difference” columns reports mean of the two-sample differences. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.
P anel B . l .  R etu rn  on  asset

















(N M -C )
1988 N 3952 133 3987 135
Mean 13.52 .45 13.07 -82.89 -1.05 -81.84
1989 N 4041 126 3983 125
Mean - 1 .0 1 .63 -1.64* .07 -.78 .84*
1990 N 4036 9 3995 94
Mean -.08 . 0 0 -.08 -3.90 - . 1 1 -3.79
1991 N 3676 91 4043 93
Mean .08 -.67 .74* - . 1 2 .57 -.70*
1992 N 3983 115 4137 117
Mean .07 -.08 .15 -.38 - . 1 2 -.26
1993 N 3995 139 4432 139
Mean -3.90 .17 -4.06 -.76 .05 -.81*
1994 N 4043 1 1 2 4529 124
Mean - . 1 2 .39 -.51 -.48 -.37 - . 1 0
1995 N 4137 247 4845 261
Mean -.38 .24 -.61** -1.58 -.30 -1.28*
1996 N 4432 288 4723 286
Mean -.76 .17 _ 9 3 ** -1.52 -.36 -1.17**
1997 N 45 325 4313 310
Mean -.48 .13 -.61* -.65 -.41 -.24
1998 N 4845 382 4283 362
Mean -1.58 .33 -1.90** -.29 - 1 .1 1 .82
1999 N 4723 379 4308 353
Mean -1.52 .42 -1.94** -.32 -.96 .64*
2 0 0 0 N 4313 256 4178 273
Mean -.65 .06 -.71** -.27 -.32 .05
2 0 0 1 N 4283 165 3497 141
Mean -.29 -.24 -.05 2.27 - . 0 2 2.29**
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Panel B.2. Cash-flow return on assets

















(N M -C )
1988 N 3723 115 3738 1 2 1
Mean 15.09 .89 14.19 -87.48 -.94 -86.54
1989 N 3790 107 3753 109
Mean -.62 .81 -1.43 .49 -.75 1.23**
1990 N 3777 81 3790 8 6
Mean .40 . 0 0 .40 -4.07 .08 -4.14
1991 N 3459 72 3821 72
Mean .65 -.44u, 1.09** -.09 .54 -.63
1992 N 3753 8 6 3919 89
Mean .49 .08 .41 -.40 -.32 -.08
1993 N 3790 93 4061 91
Mean -4.07 . 1 2 -4.18 -.64 .38 - 1 . 0 2
1994 N 3821 93 4154 1 0 0
Mean -.09 .42 -.51 -.35 -.55 .19
1995 N 3919 207 4495 204
Mean -.40 .32 -.72** -1.55 -.30 -1.25*
1996 N 4061 215 4407 215
Mean -.64 .43 -1.07** -1.09 -.24 -.85*
1997 N 4154 245 4014 230
Mean -.35 . 1 1 -.46 -.26 -.32 .06
1998 N 4495 300 3975 282
Mean -1.55 .52 -2.07** .26 - . 8 6 1 .1 2
1999 N 4407 297 3970 272
Mean -1.09 1.07 -2.16** . 2 0 -.82 1 .0 1 **
2 0 0 0 N 4014 187 3836 2 0 1
Mean -.26 1.04 -1.30** .34 .31 .03
2 0 0 1 N 3975 125 3169 1 1 2
Mean .26 . 1 0 .17 2.75 .58 2.17*
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Panel B.3. Return on cash-adjusted assets

















(N M -C )
1988 N 3934 133 3969 135
Mean -.516 .3153 -.831 -108.9 -1.431 -107.4
1989 N 4020 126 3964 125
Mean .2095 .5886 -.379 -1.14 -.902 -.238
1990 N 4012 92 3975 94
Mean 1.789 -.113 1.9016 -2.435 .1082 -2.543
1991 N 3660 91 4028 93
Mean -.916 -1.175 .2593 .1214 .5446 -.423
1992 N 3964 115 4130 117
Mean -1.14 -.368 -.772 -1.259 -.45 -.809
1993 N 3975 139 4423 138
Mean -2.435 3.4015 -5.836 -3.413 .0449 -3.458
1994 N 4028 1 1 2 4511 124
Mean .1214 .8189 -.698 1.157 -.784 1.941
1995 N 4130 247 4829 261
Mean -1.259 -.259 - 1 -1.483 -.454 -1.029
1996 N 4423 286 4715 284
Mean -1.14 -.902 -.238 - 1 . 6 6 -.598 -1.062
1997 N 4511 325 4305 310
Mean -.916 -1.175 .2593 1.157 .7442 .4128
1998 N 4829 382 4271 362
Mean -1.483 .87 -2.353 1.157 -.784 1.941
1999 N 4715 378 4297 353
Mean - 1 . 6 6 1.1404 -2 . 8 .3482 -.552 .8999
2 0 0 0 N 4305 255 4162 272
Mean -1.14 -.368 -.772 -3.413 .0449 -3.458
2 0 0 1 N 4271 165 3479 141
Mean 1.157 .7442 .4128 -.289 .1579 -.447
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Panel B.4. Return on sales

















(N M -C )
1988 N 3891 133 3897 135
Mean 4.867 1.275 3.5919 -8.39 -.976 -79.42
1989 N 3960 126 3901 125
Mean -13.07 31.627 -44.7 24.677 -1.423 26.099
1990 N 3960 91 3926 93
Mean 12.706 .0993 12.606 -7.344 .5175 -7.862
1991 N 3597 91 3958 92
Mean -1.094 -.147 -.948 79.035 1.4847 77.55
1992 N 3901 115 4057 117
Mean 24.677 106.08 -81.4 5.0089 -.271 5.2802
1993 N 3926 138 4359 139
Mean -7.344 7.1108 -14.46 -.065 .2422 -.307
1994 N 3958 1 1 2 4466 124
Mean 79.035 1.2428 77.792 22.771 -.343 23.114
1995 N 4057 247 4797 259
Mean 5.0089 -6.852 11.861 -1.581 1.5298 -3.111
1996 N 4359 288 4664 284
Mean -.065 .7769 -.842 32.626 .2731 32.353
1997 N 4466 323 4327 308
Mean 22.771 .0692 22.702 -85.57 - . 0 2 2 -85.54
1998 N 4797 379 4362 363
Mean -1.581 19.595 -21.18 -35.17 -.975 -34.2
1999 N 4664 379 4349 358
Mean 32.626 3.1885 29.438 -33.45 2.186 -35.63
2 0 0 0 N 4327 256 4170 273
Mean -85.57 1.3671 -86.93 38.275 1.6631 36.612
2 0 0 1 N 4362 168 3563 145
Mean -35.17 2.4494 -37.62 -107.1 -17.29 -89.78
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Panel B.5. Sales growth

















(N M -C )
1988 N 3539 126 3703 130
Mean -25.07 1.4849 -26.56 -8.942 -6.043 -2.899
1989 N 3677 96 3700 1 0 0
Mean -15.41 -9.014 -6.396 -3.37 -2.865 -.505
1990 N 3443 91 3711 93
Mean -29.25 -4.37 -24.88** 54.811 -1.127 55.939
1991 N 3703 114 3713 118
Mean -8.942 .1234 -9.066** -13.93 88.369 -102.3
1992 N 3700 134 3831 130
Mean -3.37 .3593 -3.729 -15.89 228.43 -244.3**
1993 N 3711 116 4083 129
Mean 54.811 1.5831 53.228 -64.53 -.728 -63.8
1994 N 3713 244 4054 262
Mean -13.93 2.1385 -16.07 -16.02 -.918 -15.1
1995 N 3831 259 4345 302
Mean -15.89 .1769 -16.07 -29.27 -4.706 -24.56
1996 N 4083 318 4170 324
Mean -64.53 4.3547 -68.89 -47.42 -8.801 -38.61
1997 N 4054 367 3917 377
Mean -16.02 -.428 -15.59* 7.889 -7.862 78.751
1998 N 4345 375 4009 364
Mean -29.27 -1.34 -18.93 -7.03 -12.75 5.7194
1999 N 4170 249 3977 282
Mean -47.42 -1.74 -45.68 -34.61 -13.06 -21.55
2 0 0 0 N 3917 165 3461 153
Mean 7.889 -5.496 76.385 -79.65 -3.747 -75.91
2 0 0 1 N 4268 394 4175 357
Mean -31.27 -12.34 -18.93 -5.03 -1.75 5.7194
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